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TRANSMIGRATION IN PLATO

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TRANSMIGRATION is often regarded as an integral part of Platonic teaching [1] and it is, of course, an undisputed fact that the idea of rebirth occurs very often in the Platonic dialogues; it holds an especially prominent position in most of his expositions of future life. Yet on closer examination it may be doubted whether Plato really considered the question of rebirth capable of or worthy of a serious and formal treatment. Metempsychosis is most often mentioned in the so-called Platonic myths, and almost regularly these are preceded by a cautious warning that what will follow is a myth, or a tradition, which may be true, but, obviously, cannot be presented as capable of proof. Even when metempsychosis is mentioned outside the myths, it is frequently, if not always, referred to as a "tradition." [2]

Of wider consequence than the manner in which the idea of metempsychosis is introduced is the way in which it is treated. It will seem as if Plato in reality considers it under two different aspects, and that these in the last resort contradict each other. If this is so, it does not, however, follow that Plato has not seen the

[1] See for instance Zeller-Nestle, Grundriss d. Gesch. d. griech. Phil., 1928, p. 165; H. W. Thomas, Epekeina, 1938, p. 79; W. Stettner, Die Seelenwanderung bei Griechen und Römern (Tüb. Beitr. XXII), 1934, p. 33: "Seit dem Menon war die Seelenwanderung für Platon ein Baustein im Gebäude seiner Philosophie geworden; er konnte nicht ausgebrochen werden, ohne grössere Teile mit sich zu reissen. In diesem Aufbau liegt die Gewähr dafür, dass er wirklich an die Seelenwanderung geglaubt hat; sie hatte ja nicht bloss selbständige Bedeutung, sondern auch dienende Funktion." P. Frutiger, Les Mythes de Platon, 1930, pp. 61, 166 sq. qualifies his opinion so that metempsychosis is a matter of faith, not a proved fact to Plato. — P. Friedländer, Platon, I, 1954, p. 347, note 15, denies expressly that there is any "Seelenwanderungslehre" in Plato.

[2] E.g. in the Meno. For Cratylus 400 C see lastly M. P. Nilsson in Gnomon, 1956, p. 18. Cf. Thomas, Epekeina, p. 51.

difficulties. But it may, on the other hand, be safely assumed that if he had made rebirth the object of a special and serious study — or thought such a study possible — he would, of course, have removed such logical incompatibilities.

It may be objected that there is not one Platonic philosophy, a closed and fixed system, but rather a continued series of attempts to solve the problems, among which are some of the most difficult that have presented themselves to human thinking. But true as this may be, there is a remarkable difference in the manner in which Plato treats e.g. reminiscence or other questions concerning the theory of knowledge, and the manner in which he considers, for instance, the workings of divine justice. And of course it must be so. It may also be said that Plato is not only a philosopher but a poet, in a way a prophet as well, and in a sense this is exactly what I mean. Plato regards metempsychosis alternately from a religious and a philosophic — or natural-philosophic — point of view, and this is the ultimate reason why the conclusions conflict with each other, even if it may be possible to make out a certain tendency to let the "philosophic" view gain the upper hand in the last dialogues.

It has been stated as a methodic principle of interpretation concerning the dialogues of Plato that "it is dangerous to draw conclusions from any of the earlier forms of statements, since they are liable to revision as the argument deepens." [3] That this principle is sound regarding the contents of a single dialogue, is evident. If applied to a series of dialogues, it would imply the presupposition that Plato, so to speak, worked in a definite direction. As long as such a thing has not been proved, there is every reason to proceed with caution.

Metempsychosis does not appear in the earlier dialogues. Theoretically, there would have been room for it in some of them, because conditions after death are discussed, but nothing is ever mentioned which has even the slightest bearing on it. The works here alluded to are the Apology, the Crito, and, from a certain point of view, the beginning (and the end) of the Phaedo. It is, however, scarcely an accident that metempsychosis is not men-

[3] N. R. Murphy, The Interpretation of Plato's Republic, 1951; quoted from J. H. S., 1954, p. 201.

tioned, for it may in fact be doubted whether such an idea coincides with the views found there.

In the Apology, to begin with, it is expressly stated (40 E) that if the second of the two possible alternatives [4] regarding conditions after death is true — viz. the dreamless sleep from which there is no awakening (i.e. a complete annihilation) and a life in blessedness — then all the dead are in Hades. This does not hold good only of those who according to Phaedo 114 C and other passages are freed from rebirth, the true philosophers, but of all kinds of men, even of such a sinner as Sisyphus, whom Plato later, in the Gorgias, locates in the place of punishment as a warning example [5] to those entering there. Here, in the Apology, Socrates expects to meet men of all sorts and to find among them the same difference between true and pretended wisdom which he found among his compatriots when examining them in the streets and public places of Athens. Among those mentioned are Agamemnon and Odysseus, but at last the latter should, according to what is said in the Republic (620 C) be right in the middle of transmigration.

Of course, the cosy picture of eschatological bliss which Socrates paints in his speech is not to be taken too seriously. To a great extent it is an expression of the grim humor which never abandoned him, and with Burnet it may be said that he regarded the Orphic beliefs in detail with a certain ironical condescension. "Their humorous possibilities strike him at once." [6] This is why he expects much pleasure in comparing his own sufferings with those of other people who have also lost their lives in consequence of a wrong sentence. But in one point he is quite serious. The pilgrim arriving in the world below will be delivered from those who in this world claim to be judges and find the true judges who are said to give judgment there (41 A). We may look in vain for a concrete idea of the way in which divine justice is carried out, but we are assured that it exists. Whatever Socrates meant by the judgment in Hades — if there is such a thing, it must be a fair judgment, pronounced by true judges. This is the serious

[4] Cf. Eranos, 1946, p. 116.
[5] *παράδειγμα* Gorgias 525 C/E.
[6] J. Burnet, Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito, 1941, ad 41 B.

background to the jests. Socrates shows here no interest at all in the future of bad men, but he is eager to impress on his audience that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death, and that he and his are not neglected by the gods (41 D). This is the Socratic faith: in the Phaedo it is thus expressed that he is sure of coming after death to wise and good gods and hopes, yet is not equally sure, of coming among men departed better than those he leaves behind (63B).

In the Apology, Minos, Aeacus and Rhadamantys are mentioned as judges. The same names recur in the Gorgias and are there expressly said to administer justice concerning men's lives upon earth. It is thus probable that Plato, when writing the Apology, meant them to judge on sins committed in this life, and not merely to act as arbitrators between the dead.[7]

That some sort of judgment is thought of in the Apology seems to be corroborated by a passage in the Crito. If Socrates escapes from prison, it is said, the laws of the state will be angry with him while he lives, and their brethren, the laws in Hades, will not receive him graciously, for they will know that he has done his best to destroy the laws upon earth (54 C). That the earthly laws will be angry implies that he would have done something contrary to justice. The parallelism between the attitude of the laws here and in the underworld seems thus to imply a belief in a judgment after death.[8] As Taylor puts it, "he will have to answer for having done what lay in him to shake the authority of law itself, and must expect to have the law itself against him in the next world as well as in this." [9]

Yet still rebirth is not mentioned, and there is no reason to suppose that it was envisaged in these contexts.

Passing over to the Phaedo, we find there, in the beginning, exactly the same view as in the Apology and the Crito. We find even an indirect rejection of the idea of metempsychosis. The argument begins, as is well known, with a double statement: no man must take his own life, but a philosopher ought to wish to die.

[7] Apology 41 A, Gorgias 523 E sq. Nilsson, Geschichte d. griech. Rel. I, 1955, p. 824. Demosthenes XVIII 127 scarcely belongs here, as they are represented as accusers, not as judges. Cf. Burnet ad Apol. 41 A.

[8] Cf. Eranos, 1948, p. 20.

[9] A. E. Taylor, Plato, the Man and his Works, 1948, p. 173.

Socrates quotes a saying, probably belonging to Orphic and Pythagorean tradition, that men here on earth are "in ward" and not allowed to escape. He will not, however, commit himself to the doctrine; that we should be imprisoned in the body is, he means, a "high" word and not easy to understand.[10] He, therefore, motivates the prohibition of suicide in another way. He, too, believes that there are gods who are our guardians, that we men are a possession of theirs, but they are guardians of another sort: they are our betters. And after death he is sure to come to other wise and good gods. "I have great hopes that there is something in store for the dead, and, as has been said of old, something much better for the good than for the wicked" (p. 63 C).[11]

Up to now, we meet a very coherent view, characterized in the first instance by a strong confidence that a good man will never suffer harm. Some sort of judgment or differentiation after death seems to be implied, but we are as yet far removed from any dogmatic or systematic doctrine. Socrates shows no interest in eschatological details. He is interested in one thing only, how to live, and how to teach others to live, in such a way as to be able to be tranquil whatever will happen. With Söderblom, we may call this the religion of a good conscience,[12] and it may be said that the conception of the imprisoned soul does not belong here. That Socrates rejects this conception is of some consequence because the idea contains two implications, viz. (1) the primacy of soul over body and (2) the view of earthly life as a punishment. The first of these Socrates — here and in the Apology — will readily accept. But the concept of life as a punishment is intimately associated with an ethically conceived metempsychosis. Whether the fact that metempsychosis is thus tacitly rejected may be used as a means of distinguishing between what the historical Socrates believed and what Plato believed, is a question which may be left

[10] The expression ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ (62 B) cannot here mean "on duty," but must mean "in prison." Socrates has already in the Apology used the simile of a man being on duty (28 D) and there is no reason why he should find the thought strange here. The idea of the imprisoned soul recurs in Phaedo 114 B, this time in no ambiguous terms. Cf. Burnet ad 62 B for various interpretations of the passage.

[11] I quote the translations of the Loeb edition, compared with that of Jowett.

[12] N. Söderblom, The Living God, 1933, p. 234.

open here. At all events, transmigration has no place in this context.

The true votaries of philosophy, so the argument goes on, are always practising death and dying. They are likely to be misunderstood by other men, who indeed think that they deserve to get their wishes fulfilled, moribund as they appear to be, but these critics have not found out what is the nature of that death which the true philosophers really deserve. Death is the separation of soul and body — a definition accepted without reserve — which means that the soul is, at last, released from the bonds of the body. And the reason why the philosopher longs for this liberation is that the body with its craving for pleasures and its imperfect instruments of knowledge constitutes a hindrance for the attainment of real knowledge. For the purest knowledge of such things as justice, or beauty, or absolute good is attained by them who go to each with the mind alone, not introducing or intruding in the act of thought, sight or any other sense together with the reason, but with the very light of mind in its own clearness searching into the very truth of each thing; he who has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole body, these being in his opinion distracting elements which when they infect the soul hinder her from acquiring knowledge of true being. Thus only after being quit of the body, after life, we shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers. If knowledge is to be attained at all, it will be after death (64 sq.). Thus the true philosopher would be very absurd if he were afraid of death (68 B).

Cebes presents an objection: what if the soul perishes and comes to an end on the very day of death — it may vanish away like smoke or air into nothingness (70 A). This objection gives occasion to the so-called first proof of immortality. Even here Socrates refers to a tradition, an "ancient doctrine" [13] that souls departing hence exist in the other world, and return hither again, and are born out of the dead (70 C). Thus the living come from the dead, just as much as the dead from the living, and consequently souls exist after death (72 A). This argument is enlarged with a

[13] παλαιὸς λόγος.

more general theory that all opposites are generated out of each other.

This is the first time, in the Phaedo, that we meet with the idea of transmigration, and it is in the form of an eternal recurrence or circuit. The wheel of birth is going round for ever. All souls participate in this everlasting rebirth. There is no question here of judgment or of punishments or rewards. Still less can there be room for an ultimate liberation from the cycle of generations, for this would evidently imply the end of life altogether. Socrates says it himself: "If all things that partake of life should die, and after they are dead should remain in this state of death, and not revive again, would it not necessarily follow that at length all things should be dead, and nothing alive? For if living beings are produced from any other things than from the dead, and living beings die, what could prevent their being absorbed in death? Yes, Socrates continues, it is in reality true that there is a reviving again, and that the living are produced from the dead" (72 C/D).

This is evidently to argue from a natural philosophical point of view.[14] The "tradition" referred to may have its root in quite different ideas — "Mother Earth," to use a very loose, perhaps also a very dubious, term, the conception of the continuity of the *gens* as indicated by the widespread custom of naming new-born children after a dead relation, and so forth; in other contexts Plato makes use of similar views [15] — but it here serves as a means of explaining life's continuous flow.

It is evident that this conception of after life is at variance with the hope expressed by Socrates a little earlier in the dialogue, of being released from the body and arriving at a state of complete purity, when "we shall hold converse with the pure, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere, which is no other than the light of truth" (67 A); or with a passage a little later (81 A) where the pure soul is said forever to live with the gods; or with

[14] Cf. U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Plato I, 1919, p. 329. Wilamowitz' comment, "individuelle Fortdauer ist damit also auf das entschiedenste verneint," bears, as the context shows, only on the general theory of "dem beständigen Wechsel von Werden und Vergehen" for which he quotes Eur. fr. 836 (Nauck). Plato reckons, at least sometimes, with a constant number of souls. Cf. below.

[15] Cf. A. Dieterich, Mutter Erde, 1905, p. 21 sq.; Nilsson, Geschichte I, pp. 175, 459, 675 sq. and below p. 18.

what is said in the final myth, that those who have duly purified themselves with philosophy, live "throughout all future time" altogether without the body (114 C). The myth leaves room for a final salvation as well as for an eternal damnation, and it need not be emphasized that this seems to be the point to which the whole argument is leading. But in both cases, eternal bliss and eternal punishment, the circuit is broken — and metempsychosis, for those that do not attain salvation, is further regarded from a moral point of view. Thus Plato in certain contexts abandons the idea of an unlimited transmigration.

It may be asked why Plato did take up the idea of eternal circuit at all, if he later found himself bound to give it up tacitly, at least as a general theory. I think this can be explained. The circuit forms, as already noted, part of the first proof of immortality. The second part is the doctrine of reminiscence. Now reminiscence presupposes preëxistence. *If* the souls, for one reason or another, come from another form of existence, reminiscence is possible. Thus the eternal circuit helps to explain reminiscence (76 C, 77 C sq.). And we may note that while the conception of the cycle of rebirths is abandoned in the continued argument, this is not the case with reminiscence, which, along with preëxistence, is later on referred to as an established fact (92 D). Now preexistence may be qualified as a necessary ingredient in Platonic thinking, as a prerequisite for reminiscence, but there is no such necessity to presuppose a previous life *on earth* (cf. 76 C). Consequently, from an epistemological point of view preëxistence, but not metempsychosis can be asserted. Yet this does not hold true of every form of preëxistence. How life in a subterranean Hades can be claimed as identical with that form of preëxistence which allows the soul to contemplate the eternal ideas, is not yet clear.

Consequently, the cycle of rebirth does not belong to the central trend of argument. Reminiscence and preëxistence were to Plato some sort of corollaries to the divine nature of the soul. On the other side, eternal rebirth is not compatible with the assurance of Socrates. There is no reason to argue the child within us out of fears (77 E, cf. 114 D) in the presence of death, if life is forever going on.

The reason why the first proof is nevertheless introduced may

perhaps be perceived. Plato often refers to a tradition, but as a rule he does not therefore mean that the tradition in question must be an established fact. He makes connection with it, so to speak, only at one point. If the tradition is accepted, for one reason or other, what he says will be understood. Thus Plato does not attempt to prove anything with the help of tradition. In such case, the tradition itself ought evidently first to be proved. And it is not likely that Plato really believed that both an eternal cycle and morally determined rebirth — which includes the possibility of salvation — were true propositions. They are not more than possibilities.

In this respect, it is instructive to observe the manner in which rebirth is introduced in the Meno. It is there meant to serve as an explanation of reminiscence. That ideas are due to reminiscence, is already established: the problem is to explain how it can be possible. At this point Plato has recourse to the idea of rebirth — if the tradition is true, we may understand how ideas can be innate in us. Here Plato relies upon the authority of Pindar and other poets who say "that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time comes to an end, which is called dying, and at another is born again, but never perishes. . . . Seeing then that the soul is immortal and has been born many times, and has beheld all things both in this world and in the nether realms, she has acquired knowledge of all and everything; so that it is no wonder that she should be able to recollect all that she knew before about virtue and other things" (81 B sq.). Now this is not the eternal circuit, for according to the passage from Pindar which Plato quotes in this context, souls, after Persephone has accepted requital for ancient sorrow, are sent back again and become noble kings and mighty men and great sages. Thus the penalty is a purification. Further, the tradition referred to proves rather too much. Reminiscence does not presuppose a previous life on earth, nor does it presuppose more than one previous existence. And, finally, according to Pindar, the souls are after death in the realm of Persephone, where they are punished; but in other instances Plato makes a clear distinction between the place of punishment and the divine home of ideas.[16]

[16] Cf. Eranos 1948 p. 16. — The statement 81 A that the tradition is "true and

In the Meno, as well as in the parallel passage of the Phaedo, transmigration is referred to in a context where the moral problem is not in the foreground. Plato is, for the moment, not interested in morals, but in the prerequisites of knowledge. Yet he feels himself free to refer to a religious tradition which, if accepted for other reasons, may help to clear up the problem under discussion. That this tradition also contains ingredients for which he has no use at the moment and which sometimes are contrary to his general view, seems not to disturb him. In a similar manner it can be understood that Plato abandoned the idea of an eternal circuit in some passages of the Phaedo where the moral problem is dominant and where consequently the question of salvation is of special importance. In this situation he cannot accept an eternal recurrence of births and rebirths.

To return to the Phaedo there follow other arguments. I quote only those which, in one way or another, touch the question of rebirth. The soul, being invisible and like the invisible, i.e. the eternal forms, is during life dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, wanders and is confused. But when returning into herself she reflects, she passes into the other world, the region of purity, eternity and immortality and unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she lives ever, when she is by herself and is not hindered, and being in communion with the unchanged, is unchanging. This state of the soul is called wisdom. And this soul, after death, passes to the place of the true Hades, which like her is invisible, pure and noble, and to the good and wise God — to the invisible world, to the divine, immortal and rational and dwells *forever* in company with the gods (79 C–81 A).

Here we note that the true Hades is not the realm of the dead but the room of eternal forms. The soul lives as it is said of the initiated, among the gods, released from the error and folly of men (81 A). For this group of souls there is no question of rebirth.

But the impure soul is held fast by the corporeal and dragged

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beautiful" is, of course, not to be understood literally: it serves as a basis for the admonition 81 D not to be idle in the pursuit of truth, for if the soul is immortal and has seen the ideas, truth is attainable. The details of its fate before and after death are in comparison less relevant. Cf. Phaedo 114 D.

down again into the visible world, because she is afraid of the invisible and of Hades, and prowls about among tombs and sepulchres, until through the craving after the corporeal, which never leaves her, she is imprisoned finally in another body (81 B–E).

Here only these two possibilities are mentioned, eternal bliss and prompt rebirth. Thus metempsychosis exists here only for sinners. Further, there is no judgment; and the impure soul never enters Hades at all.

The theory here advanced differs from the first argument in two respects. It is not an eternal recurrence, for all dead do not recur. And the form of rebirth supposed in this text cannot serve as an explanation of reminiscence, for the sinners who come back to life do not see the ideas in the interval between death and rebirth. Some of them are, further, reincarnated as animals.

In a previous passage, Socrates referred to the Orphic belief that the sinner would "lie in the mire." [17] But in the context under discussion, there is no room for punishment in Hades. On the contrary, the bad souls wander about their tombs in payment of their former evil mode of life (81 D). Reincarnation, too, is conceived as a punishment (81 F). This is in complete accord with the conception found here of Hades as the pure abode of gods and eternal forms. Rewards and punishments, it may be said, here consist in attaining exactly what the soul has desired during life upon earth, i.e. in going to the home of the gods or in going back to a new corporeal existence.[18]

In a way, this exposition looks rather like a restatement in other terms of the first argument as far as rebirth is taken into account. In both cases, there is an automatic sequence of death and new life, the only difference being that the "mechanic" causality is substituted by a moral one. In neither case do we find a divine interference or a judgment over the dead. The difference between the two arguments is, of course, that here salvation is thought possible, and this is so precisely because a moral view makes itself asserted. But it is also evident that the presence of the moral view excludes the notion of an eternal recurrence. In this context

[17] *ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται*, 69 C.

[18] Cf. 81 E: through the desire of the corporeal which clings to them, the bad souls are again imprisoned in a body.

Plato proceeds along the line of the Apology: the "tendance" of the soul becomes of the utmost weight and for the good man there is only bliss in prospect.

The final myth presents some peculiar features, especially if regarded as a summing up of the preceding discussion. It could, in fact, be expected that the different threads of thought would be woven together into a final synthesis. This is, however, not the fact.

When Socrates begins telling his myth, the immortality of the soul is regarded as established by the proofs already given or, perhaps more to the point, those present are persuaded of it. The inmost meaning of Plato seems rather to be that immortality is a kind of postulate, an ethical postulate or a presupposition of knowledge, although Socrates here presents the case the opposite way round when saying: "If the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of eternity! . . . If death had only been the end of all, the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for they would have been happily quit not only of their body, but of their own evil together with their souls" (107 C, cp. Resp. 610 D).

After death the souls are gathered in a certain place [19] from where after judgment they pass on into Hades (which here is the realm of the dead). "And when they have there received their due and remained their time, they are brought back again after many revolutions of ages" (107 E).

Here metempsychosis is supposed for *all* souls, but the souls are reincarnated only after rewards and punishments. In this connection it is said that the soul that is desirous of the body and that, *as related before,* has long been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the world of sight, is after much resistance and many sufferings led away with violence and with difficulty by her attendant genius to the place of gathering, and wanders about alone in utter bewilderment until certain times are fulfilled, after which it is carried by necessity to its fitting habitation (108 A sq.).

Plato here explicitly refers to a preceding passage (81 C), but there it was said that the bad soul was promptly reincarnated,

[19] Cf. the "meadow" in Gorgias 524 A and Od. 24.13.

without judgment and punishment, while the good was for always to live among the gods. In the latter passage, on the other hand, there are both rewards and punishments and, in addition, rebirth *for all*.[20]

After this, it follows a somewhat different version. The dead come even here to the place of judgment, but three groups are distinguished, those who have lived well and piously, those who have not, and, finally, those who have lived neither well nor ill; that is, the good, the bad, and the "lukewarm." The last go to the Acherusian lake. There they dwell and are purified of their evil deeds, and having suffered the penalty of the wrongs which they have done to others, they are absolved, and receive the rewards of their good deeds, each of them according to his deserts. After this, they are reincarnated (113 A).[21]

The incurable are hurled into Tartarus, from where they nevermore come out. Their punishment is eternal. Only if the crimes are not quite irremediable, the souls can be released if they obtain mercy from those whom they have wronged. In such case, they cease from their troubles (114 B). Whether these souls are reincarnated or not, is not said.

Finally, those who have been preëminent for holiness of life, are released from the nether world as from a prison and go to their pure home, which is above, and dwell on the upper earth; and of these such as have duly purified themselves with philosophy live throughout all future time without the body, in mansions fairer still, which may not be described — which is, perhaps, an abode in the ether on the stars (114 B sq.).[22]

[20] 108 C it is said that the bad soul is, after a certain time, carried to its fitting habitation, *εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν*. This seems to mean that it is reincarnated, cf. 81 E: *ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἤθη ὁποῖ' ἄττα ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ*. If, as Robin supposes (in the Budé edition of the Phaedo), further punishments are intimated, as an anticipation of what is said 113 D sq., it is difficult to understand the statement just made (107 E) that all the dead are brought back. This can only mean back to earth or back to the "meadow" (as in the Republic). In either case, reincarnation must be presupposed.

[21] *πάλιν ἐκπέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζῴων γενέσεις*. Burnet translates "for the birth of animals" and refers to 81 E. So also Robin. In such case, however, there would in this context be no reincarnation as human beings. Stallbaum, in his edition of the Phaedo (1866), comments: "ut migrent rursus in animalium corpora" and compares with 70 C: *πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας*, which evidently gives a better sense to the passage.

[22] Robin compares Timaeus 41 D.

In this version rebirth is stated only for the middle class.

Thus even in the myth the two principal themes recur, general recurrence and the possibility of salvation. In one context it is said that all souls are reincarnated, in the other that only some of them are.

Considering that the general rebirth is not ethically motivated here — the souls have already received rewards and punishments — we may conclude that the natural-philosophic point of view holds its own against the religious one up to the end of the dialogue, even if the thought of salvation generally is the most prominent and on most readers surely leaves the permanent impression. But we cannot get away from the fact that there are two conflicting motives that lead Plato to accept metempsychosis, the eternal continuance of life and the moral demand for justice. Now justice may be upheld even without rebirth, and the former conception is not always of such prominence as allowing it alone to motivate the assumption of metempsychosis. This seems to be the reason why Plato at times abstains from assuming rebirth where the problem of justice is solved in another way. So the tension between the two motives remains and is never solved.

Thus it cannot be true that Plato's principal motive for metempsychosis is the ethical claim for justice.[23] If so, we should be entitled to expect that rebirth would always be motivated by retribution. Such is apparently not the case. The claim for justice provokes not regularly the idea of rebirth, and, conversely, metempsychosis is not always morally motivated.

An instance of this is the myth in the Republic (614 B sq.). After death, it is said, the souls come to a mysterious region where there are two openings side by side in the earth, and above and over against them in the heaven two others. Between these the judges are sitting who after every judgment bid the righteous journey to the right and upwards through the heaven, and the unjust to take the road to the left and downward. This is the passage from the meadow; the two other openings are for the souls that come back from heaven or from the underworld. When thus coming back to the meadow the souls are either full of squalor

[23] Stettner, op. cit. p. 40: "Der Gedanke an eine ausgleichende Gerechtigkeit ist das Hauptmotiv, das Platon zur Seelenwanderung geführt hat."

and dust or clean and pure. "They appeared to have come as from a long journey and gladly departed to the meadow and encamped there as at festival, and acquaintances greeted one another, and those which came from earth questioned the others about conditions up yonder, and those from heaven asked how it fared with those others. And they told their stories to one another, the one lamenting and wailing as they recalled how many and how dreadful things they had suffered and seen in their journey beneath the earth — it lasted a thousand years — while those from heaven related their delights and visions of a beauty beyond words."

The souls come from bliss or punishment. For every wrong committed they pay a tenfold penalty, the measure of each punishment being a hundred years. Thus the souls live in the underworld ten lives, just as the reward for good deeds is tenfold.

It is remarkable that the souls return from punishment full of squalor and dust. The punishment is no purification: the principle of retribution reigns absolutely. Plato has here abandoned the idea of an improvement after death.

This is not without cause. When seven days have elapsed for the souls in the meadow, they are bidden to go before Lachesis and choose their lots for a new life. All except the incurable (see below) join in this selection of lots, and there is nothing suggesting either that reincarnation can be avoided or that it will have an end. On the contrary, it is distinctly said that the greatest happiness for man depends on his ability always to choose the right life. He must take with him to Hades an "adamantine faith" in this (619 A), for here is the supreme hazard for a man (618 B). "If at each return to the life of this world a man loved wisdom sanely, and the lot of his choice did not fall out among the last, we may venture to affirm, from what was reported thence, that not only will he be happy there but that the path of his journey thither and the return to this world will not be underground and rough but smooth and through the heavens" (619 E).

Transmigration has no end. In itself, it is no punishment because all souls take part in it. Nor do we find the idea of an original sin, in consequence of which souls have once been incarnated;

such a thought is by the way almost necessarily combined with the idea that salvation is possible.[24] The punishment in Hades has not improvement as its goal — it is nothing other than retribution — and the soul is itself responsible for its future. Before selecting their lots for the next life, they are addressed by "a certain prophet" in words of a strangely heavy and sinister ring: "Souls that live for a day, now is the beginning of another cycle of mortal generation where birth is the beacon of death. No divinity shall cast lots for you, but you shall choose your own deity. Let him to whom falls the first lot select a life to which he shall cleave of necessity. But virtue has no master over her, and each shall have more or less of her as he honours her or does her despite. The blame is his who chooses: God is blameless" (617 D sq.).

Nevertheless, the soul has to choose. Man cannot shirk the new life. Rebirth is not due to any blame on the part of the soul, but the soul must bear the consequences. The claim to individual responsibility is urged so far that existence in the last resort becomes devoid of meaning. For it has no end.

In this form of metempsychosis there is, it is true, something of a moral causality, insofar as a virtuous life affords some possibility of a prosperous choice for the next incarnation. But rebirth as such is in no wise ethically motivated; it is not the idea of justice that has induced Plato to take up this view here. On the contrary, the demand for justice is satisfied by rewards and punishments in the Hades. And metempsychosis is not religiously conceived, for there is no possibility of salvation. Thus we find here once more the idea of eternal recurrence, as a means of explaining life's endless reiteration. That is why it is said that the amount of souls is constant (611 A). The soul is immortal and cannot perish. "But if it is so, you will observe that these souls must always be the same. For if none perishes they could not, I suppose, become fewer nor yet more numerous. For if any class of immortal things

[24] The myth in the Phaedrus is an instance of this. The salient point in this connection is that there is a possibility of salvation for those who three times have chosen the philosophical life (249 A). But in the Phaedrus also the idea of recurring world-ages is found, e.g. 249 C. If the Phaedrus really is earlier than the Republic, this would mean that the idea of eternal recurrence tends to be dominating to Plato. Robin (Budé ed., Introduction p. CXXIV) points out that in this dialogue also a constant quantity of souls is presupposed.

increased you are aware that its increase would come from the mortal and all things would end by becoming immortal."

This is, as can be easily seen, essentially the argument met with in the Phaedo (72 D). It is true that Plato, in the Republic, also speaks about eternal punishment [there are incurables who can never get out of the place of punishment (615 D)], but this inconsistency only shows the intrinsic difficulties in his theory. The myth of the Republic leaves room for eternal punishment but not for eternal salvation, except insofar as it is possible always to choose a good life.

The main argument apparently is that the eternal circuit explains why life on earth is forever going on; without it life would be impossible. But in such case salvation in the true sense of the word — a final and definitive liberation from the chain of rebirths — is actually made impossible. A reduction of the number of souls as are incorporated in human bodies would imperil the continued existence of mankind. Thus life has no end. Its wheel is going on forever. It is no mere coincidence that the spindle turning the world lies on the knees of Necessity (617 B).

It does, in fact, seem as if the idea of eternal recurrence tends to dominate in the later works of Plato. In the Laws, the definite number of souls is apparently presupposed (904 A/B) and reincarnation has no end.[25] To be sure, we find in the Laws also punishments in Hades combined with reincarnation [26] and even a judgment after death is intimated.[27] But a final salvation seems not to be thought of.

In one passage Plato says that mankind is "by nature coeval with the whole of time, in that it accompanies it continually both now and in the future." This is so understood that the means by which mankind is immortal is that it reproduces itself —"by leaving behind it children's children and continuing ever one and the same, it thus by reproduction shares in immortality." [28] There-

[25] Cf. 903 D: "and inasmuch as soul, being conjoined now with one body, now with another, is always undergoing all kinds of changes either of itself or owing to another soul. . ."

[26] 870 D/E, cf. 904 C, 872 E, 881 A.

[27] 959 B, cf. P. Boyancé, La religion de Platon, Rev. Et. Anc. 1947, p. 180.

[28] Leges 721 C: *γένος οὖν ἀνθρώπων ἐστί τι ξυμφυὲς τοῦ παντὸς χρόνου, ὃ διὰ τέλους αὐτῷ ξυνέπεται καὶ ξυνέψεται, τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἀθάνατον ὂν τῷ παῖδας παίδων καταλειπόμενον, ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ὂν ἀεί, γενέσει τῆς ἀθανασίας μετειληφέναι.*

fore, "it is a duty to lay hold on the everliving reality [29] by providing servants for God in our own stead; and this we do by leaving behind us children's children" (773 E).[30] This might be said to denote the continued existence of the *gens* in contradistinction to personal and individual immortality. But if we compare it with another text, where Plato expresses himself more explicitly, and at the same time have in mind the idea so often met with that the number of souls is restricted, that is, that the same souls are always carrying on human life, it appears in a somewhat different light. Diotima, in the Banquet, is made to say that the mortal nature ever seeks to be immortal (207 D sq.)." "In one way only can it succeed, and that is by generation; since so it can always leave behind it a new creature in place of the old. It is only for a while that each living thing can be described as alive and the same, as a man is said to be the same person from childhood until he is advanced in years; yet though he is called the same he does not at any time possess the same properties; he is continually becoming a new person" — he loses always something, hair, knowledge and so on, and is always gaining something new instead. "Every mortal thing is preserved in this way; not by keeping it exactly the same for ever, *like the divine*, but by replacing what goes off or is antiquated with something fresh, in the semblance of the original. Through this device, Socrates, a *mortal* thing partakes of immortality, both in its body and in all other respects; but with the *immortal* it is in another way." Now as the soul is immortal, there is no need of reproducing for its continued existence; consequently the preservation of mankind consists in the corporeal reproduction while the souls are unchanged. The double connotation of the word psyche, "soul" and "life" lies behind this reasoning. Commenting on the Phaedo, Wilamowitz says, "Wem die Seele sozusagen eine Monade war, unteilbar und als 'Leben' dem Tode unzugänglich, der konnte nicht anders schliessen, als dass das Sterben und Geborenwerden der Menschen als Wanderung der 'lebendigen' Seele durch die sterblichen Leiber aufzufassen war." [31]

[29] *τῆς ἀειγενοῦς φύσεως ἀντέχεσθαι.*
[30] Cf. des Places ad loc. (Budé edition) and Nilsson, Geschichte, I, p. 675 sq.
[31] Platon I p. 338, cf. p. 330 and Phaedrus 245 D/E. Frutiger, op. cit. p. 141 sq.

In the Timaeus it is at least an open question whether the souls after having lived their due span of time on earth really are permitted forever to live happily on their consort star — in which case, according to the preceding cosmology, all human life ought to come to an end.[32] But time is, we read in the Timaeus (p. 37 D), a moving likeness of eternity. This is the same as what is said in the Laws that mankind is coeval with time (721 C). The material world, as a reflection of the ideal world, cannot cease to exist (cf. 41 B). There is no place in Platonism for a real eschatology, and this is the true reason why the religious demand for salvation and the philosophic theories of the composition of the world never wholly agree with each other. To Greek thought, as Professor Puech has very aptly expressed it, "le déroulement du temps est cyclique, et non rectiligne," [33] and so it is said, in almost the same words, in a passage from the Phaedo alluded to above (72 B): "if one class of things were not constantly given back in the place of another, revolving as it were in a circle, but generation went in a straight line . . . then all things would cease to be produced." Hence every idea of creation as well as of any consummation of time is absent. At most, as in the Timaeus, it is possible to advance a cosmology, but the end of time is never mentioned.

The concept of an eternal circuit, or some sort of everlasting harmony in the universe, is indeed very Greek. We find it in Aristotle and the Stoa, but there are traces of it in very early thinking as well.[34] The way in which divine justice is administered or the order of fate upheld often shows very clearly the predominance of this view, e.g. the balance between *hubris* and *nemesis*. But in Plato, this idea is strongly counterbalanced by the religious demand for salvation. In Plato, to quote Father Festugière, there is more than one man. "There is the metaphysical geometer. There is the man athirst for the Eternal." [35]

It is very difficult to decide whether we have any right to try to harmonize these different ideas about the soul's fate after death. It is quite possible that Plato himself never felt it necessary to

[32] 42 B. Cf. F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, 1937, p. 144, note 1, and A. Rivaud, Introduction to the Timaeus (Budé edition) p. 92.

[33] Proceedings of the 7th Congress for the History of Religions, 1951, p. 34.

[34] E. Rohde, Psyche, 1925, II p. 29, 123, 165. Stettner, op. cit. p. 19.

[35] A.-J. Festugière, Personal Religion among the Greeks, 1954, p. 46.

systematize them, because such things belonged not to the realm of knowledge, but of meaning (doxa) — at all events he did apparently not try to do it himself. And, of course, this is the reason why he preferably treats such things in the form of myths. On the other hand, with a philosopher of Plato's distinction, it is quite unthinkable that he did not see the incompatibilities referred to throughout this paper. Some of them occur, as we have seen, even in the same dialogue.

One explanation would be that Plato successively tried various thinkable possibilities. This would account for at least some of the different opinions expressed in the Phaedo. Starting with the simple confidence of Socrates that everything must eventually be well for a good man, and surely Plato never doubted this for Socrates himself, he may have elaborated some theory including the lots of bad men as well — hence rewards and punishments in the afterlife. To what extent he was influenced by Orphic and other traditions is a question that does not belong here. The demand for justice may, however, be satisfied in various ways, and there is no need to emphasize the fact that the exact way in which divine justice was exacted was always a question of secondary importance to Plato, provided that the ultimate victory of justice was assured. So far we may, I think, at least in principle, be on the right track. But alongside this line of thought there goes, as we have seen, almost from first to last another, the eternal circuit. And there is scarcely any real attempt on the part of Plato to conciliate the two ideas. Theoretically the conflict between them can be solved only by supposing that Plato reckoned with cosmic ages and that everything said about eternal bliss or eternal punishments referred only to one of these successive periods of time. There is some evidence that Plato, in his later works, reasoned along such lines, but there is no evidence at all that he did so for instance in the Phaedo. Anyhow, we cannot state that Plato ever arrived at a systematic doctrine about the last things. To many this never-ended search, these tentative efforts to arrive at truth, starting from various points of departure and over again revolving the problems, are the real charm of Plato, and surely that is one reason why he is still a living author and an inspiring force.

CHANGING IDEAS IN NEW TESTAMENT ESCHATOLOGY

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Sooner or later every study of the New Testament must deal with the problem of its eschatology. There are several reasons for this. In the first place, the center of the New Testament is the messiah whom the earliest preachers identified as Jesus. While the term itself simply means, "the Anointed One," by the time of the New Testament it had come to be inseparably associated with eschatological hopes. That these hopes were expressed in varied and often contradictory forms only adds to the problem. In any case, it is clear that the proclamation that the messiah is Jesus is inevitably an eschatological proclamation.

In the second place, the New Testament documents are suffused with eschatological figures, expressions, and hopes. It is no longer possible to expunge this element from the records as extraneous. It was the lasting service of Albert Schweitzer to force New Testament scholarship to face this fact squarely. It may be accepted as axiomatic, therefore, that the message of the primitive church was an eschatological message and any account of it must deal with the problem of eschatology.

Professor Dodd has sought to mitigate the radical conclusions of the "thorough-going eschatology" of Schweitzer by an hypothesis that arranges the evidence in such a way as to come virtually to the opposite conclusion. This theory has become familiar as realized eschatology. The important thing to note in comparing these two theories is the fact that New Testament eschatology is not consistent and therefore any system that seeks to present the matter in an organic unity must do so by a process of selection which eliminates certain factors as either accretions or garbled accounts of the facts.

Dodd, in his Parables of the Kingdom,[1] has attempted to dem-

[1] (New York, Scribners, 1936), pp. 49, 53.

onstrate that the explicit statements in the Synoptics make the claim that the kingdom has arrived. Therefore, while the implications and traditional interpretations of many of the parables point to a futuristic eschatology, the explicit statements must be given priority and the parables, in consequence, are to be interpreted in that light.

This approach has certain very attractive features, among which is the fact that this "bold application" [2] of Jewish eschatological ideas to the event of Jesus predetermines to a considerable extent the way in which the apocalyptic figures shall be understood. This automatically removes several of the cruder elements of the latter.

Another feature of this theory is the fact that it provides a convenient and understandable point of departure for a development within the later New Testament preaching and thought whereby the eschatological hopes become more and more at home in a world that to all outward appearances has not changed. From this point of view, it becomes possible — especially by an understanding of a certain mythological character of the apocalyptic element — to make the New Testament proclamation of the Eschatological Event in Jesus Christ at home in the modern world.

There are, however, serious difficulties with this approach. For instance, Dodd has not succeeded in adequately accounting for all of the futuristic aspects involved. In one place, he admits that

> While, however, the New Testament affirms with full seriousness that the great divine event has happened, there remains a residue of eschatology which is not exhausted in the "realized eschatology," of the Gospel, namely, the element of sheer finality. [3]

But it is precisely this "element of sheer finality" that is the essence of the *eschaton*. This is evident in the very meaning of the word. According to his thesis, the realization of the lack of this "finality" led to the "naive" expectation that the Lord would immediately appear, on the one hand, and the "Christ-mysticism" of St. Paul, on the other. But is not the appearance of this naive ex-

[2] The Apostolic Preaching, (New York, Harpers, 1951), p. 87.
[3] Ibid, p. 93.

pectation sufficient evidence that the Church was aware that its eschatological hopes had not yet been realized? If it had held such a notion at the first, it had certainly come to the point, by the time of the appearance of St. Paul, of recognizing that it had been wrong. This, then, removes the documents themselves, at least, from the position of "realized eschatology."

If Dodd is right in his interpretation of the Gospel statements that the kingdom has come, we then have three levels of tradition — or perhaps better, three stages of development in eschatology — before us. 1. The belief that the *eschaton* has arrived. 2. The realization that it has not yet come and the "naive expectation" that Christ will immediately appear again to bring it. 3. The separation of the *eschaton* from the unique event of Christ's first advent and the corresponding development of the faith along the lines of Christ-mysticism, etc. But is this the right order of events?

The fundamental difficulty that appears in the hypothesis of "realized eschatology" lies in Dodd's failure to distinguish between the anticipating events and the *eschaton* itself. Is it not possible to understand the high pitch of expectance and hope that were admittedly present during the ministry of Jesus to mean that the guarantee of the *eschaton* was with them? That is to say, the preliminary events had begun to appear. But there seems to be no warrant for saying that the disciples believed that the "event" itself had yet arrived. The evidence for this will be dealt with later.

The point is, there must be a distinction made between the eschatological Man and the eschatological Event. The question now arises, is it not possible, therefore, to approach the problem of New Testament eschatology from the point of view of the very conflicting ideas that have given the problem such an apparently insoluble character?

It is the purpose of this paper to reëxamine the evidence in quest of an hypothesis that fairly accounts for the facts which appear to point in opposite directions. The approach to be used will be that of a chronological arrangement of the material according to the changing scene in the life of the Christian community.

That there are a number of different eschatological ideas present

in the New Testament goes without saying. But it does not follow that they can be subsumed under the point of view of any one of them. Nor is it necessary to assume that they bear no organic relation to one another but simply exist as independent ideas in different communities. May it not be possible to allow this variety to tell its own story?

This variety, it is here maintained, associated with the proclamation of Jesus as the messiah is the result of various attempts to answer a basic problem and its result, by the Christian community at different points in the development of the Primitive Church. These answers did not replace one another nor exclude previous answers from the tradition. The method, rather, was that of reinterpretation, added explanation, or "correction." In consequence, these various eschatological ideas are found side by side, or in some cases, are indirectly reflected by later material in our canonical Gospels.

To describe this problem and its result, we shall divide New Testament development into four periods. The first one comprising the public ministry of Jesus, we shall call Period A. This period ended abruptly with the crucifixion. Period B began equally abruptly with the resurrection experiences. The succeeding periods cannot be so definitely distinguished. There is presupposed as the background to all this what might be called, Period Pre-A. This involves the whole history of the development of Jewish eschatological thought. There is not room here to describe this period but it will be in the background of the entire discussion.

There is one strand of tradition within the Gospels which, while it does not by any means claim that the *eschaton* has arrived, makes it clear that the final events have begun and the *eschaton* itself is impending. This was the burden of the preaching of Jesus (Mark 1:15), "The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent, and believe in the gospel." Matthew (4:1-2) places this same message in the mouth of John the Baptist. Luke (4:16 ff) characteristically provides a full account of the occasion of the first sermon in which Jesus identifies this event with his own preaching. It should be noted, however, that the Isaiah passage used does not identify the preacher with the messiah.

The eschatological climate within which Jesus' ministry took

place is reflected in Luke's words, "As the people were in expectation, and all men questioned in their hearts concerning John, whether perhaps he were the Christ" (3:15). There is good reason to believe this to be an accurate description of the situation.

The difficult statement in Matthew 10:23 upon which Schweitzer depended largely for his thesis of thorough-going eschatology, gives vivid expression to this mood. On one hand, the *eschaton* obviously has not yet arrived. But on the other hand, the extreme urgency of the hour is quite plain. The disciples will scarcely have time to complete their mission before a momentous phase of the final events has arrived.

What this passage implies concerning Jesus' own teaching on eschatology is not our concern here. There are difficulties involved in it that should caution against building any theory of Jesus' eschatology upon it. The point is that it reflects the mood of extreme expectancy that is evident elsewhere.[4] The same is true of the parallels of this story (Mark 6:7 ff; Luke 9:1 ff; 10:1 ff). The command to take no extra provisions — which Matthew and Luke construe as a justification of ministerial compensation (Matthew 10:10; Luke 10:7) — is to enable them to make a rapid tour.

Thus Period A may be described as the time, during Jesus' public ministry, when the *eschaton* was expected momentarily. Nothing remained, apparently, to be fulnlled before its coming. But it was not thought of as having actually arrived.

There is probably little, if any, more agreement in the tradition regarding the nature of the *eschaton* than there is about its time. There is good reason to believe that the disciples expected a political and, perhaps, more or less mundane event (not, of course, without an act of God being involved).

The tradition concerning the dispute about the favorite seats in the kingdom reflects something of this thought. It is noteworthy that both Mark (10:35 ff) and Matthew (20:20 ff) place this story on the journey to Jerusalem. While admittedly not too much significance is to be attached to the historical outline of the Gospels,

[4] However, it is quite possible that this particular passage originated in Period B. The point is that it evidences that kind of imminent eschatology which characterized Period A and became the legacy of Period B.

it seems reasonable, nevertheless, to see this episode in connection with the approach to the ancient Royal City. This makes the "triumphal entry" understandable as well as the charge "King of the Jews" which was brought against Jesus in Pilate's Hall. Whatever may be the interpretation of the strange saying concerning the two swords (Luke 22:38), it surely evidences the influence of mundane-political messianism. Is this what lies behind the saying about taking the kingdom by force? (Matthew 11:12).

Something of this climate of ideas appears to be present in the saying about rewards. (Mark 10:29 f; Matthew 19:29; Luke 18:29 f). The Markan text presents some difficulties but the phrase, "now in this time," is probably in the original form. Matthew and Luke, therefore, seek to temper the saying — Matthew by leaving it out altogether and Luke by joining it immediately with the phrase that in Mark has every appearance of an appendage: "and in the world to come eternal life."

Another saying that gives evidence of having been added to in order to accommodate it to a later period is Jesus' defense of his disciples for not fasting. His answer was in the form of a question, "Can the wedding guests fast while the bridegroom is with them?" Thus far it sounds like "realized eschatology" but the expansion in the form of a prediction of Jesus' departure makes it clear that the *eschaton* has not yet come. Whatever the original import, the saying is added to because it appeared to reflect the anticipation of an immediate *eschaton* and therefore at a later time needed correcting.

This expectancy is indicated also in the sayings about the signs of the times and the parable of the fig tree. The first of these (Matthew 16:1 ff; Luke 12:54 ff) reflects the unwillingness of a group of Jews to share this ardent expectation. The second (Mark 13:28 f; Matthew 24:32 f; Luke 21:29 f) is a clear statement of the situation in Period A. The *eschaton* has not arrived, manifestly, but the enlightened observer has before him the unmistakable evidence that its time has arrived. It is "even at the doors."

Perhaps the strongest evidence for the situation in Period A, which at the same time clearly shows its separation from what we shall describe as Period B, lies in the "wrong beliefs" that are "corrected" in the tradition. This "correcting" is presumed to have

been done in Period B and later. We have already noted one example of this in the saying about fasting. One of the best examples of this is in the setting which Luke provides for the parable of the pounds (19:11 ff). First of all, they were near Jerusalem where, apparently, they expected the *eschaton* to take place. The motive, consequently, assigned to the telling of the parable was to counteract the mistaken notion "that the kingdom of God was to appear immediately." If the point of the parable is seen in the absence of the nobleman in "a far country," it makes more understandable the well-known difficulty involved in the inclusion of "enemies" in Luke's version of the story. We will have more to say on this point later.

Another passage which is placed by Luke in the actual setting of Period B but is actually a Period A idea occurs in Luke 24:13-27. The question, "Was it not necessary that the Christ should suffer these things and enter into his glory?" is in answer to the wrong belief, "But we had hoped that he was the one to redeem Israel." That is to say, "We had hoped that he was the one to usher in the *eschaton*" (while he was still alive, of course). Here the problem of the crucifixion in relation to the messianic beliefs about Jesus comes clearly into focus.

The general climate of ideas indicated here is the same as that indicated above in connection with rewards of kingdom service and the choice seats in the kingdom. What the nature of these ideas was can be seen, to some extent at least, in the various messianic rebellions that took place in this period of Jewish history. [5] However this political conception does not by any means exhaust the messianic thought of Period A. It seems to have included elements from the Enoch "Son of Man" apocalyptic ideas. (Cf. Mark 14:62, para.)

The false accusation of Jesus that he had threatened to destroy the Temple (Mark 14:58, para.) belongs in this latter group. It was "corrected" in church tradition along two lines. One, that he was speaking metaphorically of his death and resurrection (John 2:19 ff). Second, that he had merely predicted its destruction (Mark 13:1-2, para.). Whether the actual saying that lies back of this was a forecast of the fate of Jerusalem is not the

[5] I.e., Theudas and Judas, Acts 5:36 f; The Egyptian, Acts 21:38; et al.

point here. What is important to see in this connection is the fact that there was an idea afloat that Jesus would destroy the Temple (and rebuild it). (Cf. Acts 6:14). This was undoubtedly taken in Period B to be a messianic notion which needed "correcting."

A "wrong belief" the correcting of which became a cardinal point in the preaching of the early church is presented in Peter's rebuke of Jesus (Mark 8:31 ff and para.). It is significant that in both Matthew and Mark this dialogue is associated with Peter's confession of Jesus as the messiah. Luke does the same thing except that he leaves out Peter's "wrong belief." The idea is there, nevertheless. Jesus' prediction of his passion answers the question, "What kind of messiah?" as well as, "When will be the *eschaton?*" i.e., it must be preceded by the passion.

Another example of this "correcting" of eschatological ideas actually occurs in the B period but it probably belongs in Period A, or at least originated there. It is found in Acts 1:6-8, "Lord, will you at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?" This tradition is probably closely related to Mark 13:4, 32. Luke on several occasions has made use of Markan material in Acts rather than in his Gospel.[6] Mark actually has two answers to this question: 13:5-31 and 13:32. The first of these presupposes the crucifixion and *parousia* which, as is clearly shown elsewhere in the Gospel, the disciples had not accepted or understood. It must, then, be assigned to Period C (see esp. vs. 10). This answer makes the question apply to a post-resurrection apocalyptic event which was in all probability not its original import. Therefore the Acts form of the question may well be closer to the original tradition.

The other answer (Mark 13:32 and Acts 1:7), indefinite as it is, would suit any subsequent period equally well. Is it possible that this answer goes back to Jesus himself? This question, in one form or another, is the great eschatological question for which each period found it necessary to furnish an answer.

It is not difficult to believe that, whatever their original import, parables involving an absent master (Mark 12:35 ff, 41 ff; Luke 20:9 ff; 19:12 ff; Matthew 25:14) served to explain the crucifixion

[6] Cadbury, in Foakes-Jackson and Kirsopp Lake, Beginnings of Christianity, (London, Macmillan and Co., 1933), Vol. IV, p. 134.

and failure of the *eschaton* during Jesus' life. Of course, this motif would serve again equally well at the close of Period B.

A number of passages strongly intimate that the failure of the *eschaton* during Jesus' life was due to the refusal of the people to accept it. This appears to be the meaning of the "hateful citizens" inserted into Luke's parable of the pounds. Jesus' lament over Jerusalem implies this. The upbraiding of unrepentant cities in Matthew 11:20 ff, and such themes as the perverse "sign seekers" (Matthew 12:38 ff; 16:1 ff) seem to place the burden of responsibility for the delay upon the unrepentant.

The change of thought from Period A to Period B is shown in the quotation in Matthew 21:42 and Acts 4:11 from Psalm 118:22–23. By means of this prophecy the rejection and crucifixion of the messiah is made a part of the prophetic scheme and final victory is again assured. In this same vein, the rejection of the Son of Man by the elders and chief priests and scribes is made responsible for his death (and the delay of the *eschaton*?) but it is here a matter of prophetic necessity (Luke 9:22 and para.). Now the rejection is known to be a part of the predicted order of events. The *eschaton*, in other words, suffered a temporary delay as a result of this rejection but its ultimate triumph is nevertheless assured. Thus again the failure of Period A expectations is explained by the intransigence of the Jews. Such is the meaning of the parable of the Wedding Feast (Luke 14:16 f) and the wicked tenants (Luke 20:9 ff). The conception of the messianic role of Jesus is determined by this change of thought.

When once Old Testament prophetic material began to be applied to Jesus, it began in its turn to shape the tradition about Jesus and influence the development of messianic thought concerning him. Two messianic problems which exemplify this tendency, will serve to demonstrate how literally the imminence of the *eschaton* was taken. At the same time the tradition concerning the latter of these reveals the fact that the *eschaton* was not thought of as having arrived in Period A. The problems are the Davidic ancestry of the messiah and the coming of Elijah as a herald of the messiah.

Answers to the first of these were developed along two lines. One line attempted to establish Jesus' Davidic ancestry. This is seen

in the genealogical tables in Matthew and Luke. Although these are probably of later origin (this problem concerned the later periods as well as A), they represent one strand of thought. Other, and perhaps older, examples of this tradition are seen in the cry of the blind beggar (Mark 10:46 f) and Mark's account of the triumphal entry (11:10).

The other answer to this question consisted of a denial of the Davidic ancestry to the messiah. This tradition is given in the form of a rabbinic argument by Jesus himself (Mark 12:35 and para.).

The answer to the second problem was a double-barrelled solution to messianic questions. The fluid state of the messianic thought of the time is shown by the fact that while at one time messianic hope had fastened upon John the baptizer as its object (Luke 3:15; John 1:20), at another time Jesus was thought to be Elijah returning to herald the coming of the Messianic Age (Mark 8:27 ff and para.). The marked similarity of the opening description of the preaching of Jesus and that of John regarding the kingdom (cf. Matthew 3:2 and 4:17) provide a hint that there may have been more reason for this than the Gospels are willing to grant. Manifestly, then, there was no widespread notion at that time that the *eschaton* had arrived. Instead, the essence of Peter's confession was simply that Jesus, rather than being the herald of the messiah, was the messiah himself. This, of course, reopened the question of Elijah's coming to fulfill the prediction.

The answer to this last question is that John the baptizer was, functionally at least, Elijah. This is one reason for the high commendation of John by Jesus which occurs in this connection (Matthew 11:14 and para.). The way in which John is made to witness to this answer, both directly, in the Synoptic accounts of his ministry, and indirectly here by sending the question by his disciples, is noteworthy. This solution not only fills the need for an Elijah but it solves the problem of the relation of the John the baptizer movement to the Church.[7]

It is possible that the mount of transfiguration came to be

[7] Cf. opposite view in John 1:21. Note: The depicting of John in a coat of camel's hair and leather girdle aids the picture of an Elijah *redivivus*. Perhaps this description resulted from the belief that he was Elijah.

used as another solution to the Elijah problem. Elijah's appearance to the three disciples would then be the fulfillment of the Malachi prophecy. It is interesting that both II Peter and the Apocalypse of Peter associate Peter's knowledge of the *eschaton* with this episode.

It is also possible that the argument over the baptism of John (Mark 11:27 ff) has back of it the assumption that John was Elijah. This would provide a real connection between the authority of Jesus and John's baptism.

Period A is characterized then as a period in which all things were believed to be fulfilled that were necessary for the coming of the *eschaton. But it had not yet come.* The messiah — the Eschatological Man — had arrived and the event was expected momentarily. This period came to an abrupt close with the crucifixion.

Period B opened with the resurrection experience. Peter's announcement that he had seen the Lord and the subsequent experiences with the Risen Lord revived the eschatological hopes that had been dashed by the crucifixion. But now the thought about the *eschaton* developed along a different line, and a second stratum corresponding to this is clearly observable in the tradition.

Unlike Period A, this period has no clear cut posterior limits to separate it from subsequent developments. There are, however, sufficient evidences of linear development and time-conditioned sequence to justify dividing this treatment into further periods. It must be kept in mind that the periods subsequent to the crucifixion overlap and vary in different localities and with different writers. Often various lines of thought move side by side in the same general time. The temporal sequence here described is only a general pattern of development.

Period B carried over from Period A certain basic ideas that become fixed factors in the thinking of the Church, one of which becomes the foundation stone of apostolic preaching and belief. These ideas are, nevertheless, due to undergo considerable reorientation and alteration in form. The first and fundamental of these is that in Jesus the Eschatological Man (messiah) had

arrived. This is the meaning of the Acts accounts of apostolic preaching which proclaimed "the Christ as Jesus."

The other ideas carried over from A are in part at least in support of this. Jesus' Davidic ancestry was an attestation of his qualification to be the messiah. It was a valuable point in the context of the Old Testament. The genealogies of Matthew and Luke are expansions of this theme. The other answer to this problem, which denied the connection between the messiah and David, was undoubtedly an early — perhaps original — tradition which was dropped without further development. It was out of phase with the growing practice of applying Jewish prophecy to Jesus. Associating the Elijah prophecy of Malachi (3:4) with John the baptizer fitted very well into the requirements of the situation and was retained.

The teachings of both John and Jesus were retained and served several functions. For one thing, they represented the ethics which would obtain in the kingdom of God. Therefore, they were valid as "interim ethic." Later as Periods C and D began to develop, they become the basis for the practical ethics of the Church in the world during its indefinite sojourn.

A number of Jesus' sayings were reoriented to provide material for solving the problem of the crucified messiah. The parables of the absent master, a long journey, the unexpected return, the imperceptible growth until the harvest, the thief, etc., became valuable, whatever their original import, for understanding the absence of the messiah and the delay of the *eschaton*. He had said it would be delayed but they had not understood. Whether or not Jesus had actually predicted his death, the tradition to that effect was valuable now for its understanding. Some of this material aided in the transition from Period B to C. The application of prophecy to Jesus aided in this and gained impetus thereby. It may be observed at a number of points that a Scripture brought in to demonstrate the divine character of one event, having once become attached thereto, becomes a source for further elaboration of details and creation of other "events." Isaiah 53 became important to this process. (Cf. Acts 8:26 ff.) Indefinite references to the Prophets and appeals to Jesus' predictions both made it plain that his rejection and crucifixion were

the unfulfilled parts of the scheme of things and had been in the plan all along. Only the disciples had failed to grasp it.

This, then, is the point at which the "correcting" of certain "wrong beliefs" outlined above in connection with Period A enters the picture.

The distinct characteristic of Period B is the notion that with the crucifixion and/or exaltation the conditions for the coming of the *eschaton* have finally been fulfilled. The notion of the *parousia* was developed in this connection. The exaltation and ascension of Jesus was to place him in position for the *parousia* (Acts 1:9 ff). The momentary expectation of the *eschaton* was revived. The sayings that claim its arrival before "this generation" passes belong here. Quite possibly, as noted above, the difficult passage in Matthew 10:23 actually belongs here also. It should be observed that this saying is integrally connected with later material which is manifestly out of place in the original story of the mission of the Twelve.[8] If this is true, the progression of thought is somewhat as follows: 1. The expectation of an immediate *parousia* and establishment of a "waiting community" (Acts 2:44 ff). 2. The dispersion of the believers from Jerusalem and the belief that the *eschaton* would arrive before they had finished evangelizing Palestine. 3. The failure of this, and the beginning of Period C with the vision of the world mission of the Church in "this generation" at the end of which the appointed hour would arrive (cf. Mark 13:10).

There is nothing in this stratum of material to warrant the conclusion that the *eschaton* was believed to have arrived. In places the mood of expectancy was rising to a feverish pitch and the tempo of God's activity in the world affairs was believed to be increasing toward that Day. But the end was not yet. Probably this activity of God in gathering his elect and preparing the Church for the final event was the basis of Paul's Christ-mysticism. But it does not follow that the *eschaton* was present in any real sense. It was believed to be imminent and was casting heavy shadows before it. Such was Period B. In some quarters this period persisted long after Period C had manifested itself and the third stratum had begun to crystallize.

[8] This whole section could aptly be entitled "A Christian Preacher's Handbook."

The essential characteristic of Period C is the arrangement of systems of further conditions upon the fulfillment of which the coming of the *eschaton* depends. The latter now begins to recede and there is a marked increase in the more mundane problems of the Church. Conversely, details of apocalypticism become more prominent in some quarters. (Cf. Mark 13; Matthew 24; Luke 21). The sayings that place the times and seasons in the Father's hands (Acts 1:7; Mark 13:32) are useful in this period.

Care must be taken not to draw the lines too sharply here. The difference between B and C involves other factors than linear development. There is a change in the ethical emphasis. Whereas in Period B the cry was "repent" as though the very hour had arrived, now the ethical teaching became more concerned with day to day problems. It may not be amiss to assume that the great body of ethical teaching in the New Testament achieved its importance — hence its preservation — in the context of Period C. This, of course, is not to say that eschatology had become more ethical, for eschatology was always ethical to the core as R. H. Charles has pointed out.[9] But it does mean that as the "final hour" receded into a more indefinite and distant future, ethics became more concerned with practical living and less with last-minute preparation for judgment. In view of the availability of material from Jesus' teaching for this ethical emphasis, is it not possible that this is coming closer to the thought of Jesus himself? The moral stimulus in proclaiming the imminence of the *eschaton* lies on the surface in the Gospels and in Paul. The constant word is "watch, therefore. . ." But this sometimes resulted in creating unanticipated problems. II Thessalonians 2 is a case in point. The difference in this teaching is more concerned with this result than with a fundamental transition from B to C in Paul's thought.

Nevertheless, there must have been an underlying, sincere belief in these ideas which were so used in order for them to have been used for such moral stimulus. And, as one-sided as this study admittedly is on this point, it is attempting to trace the history

[9] Religious Development Between the Old and the New Testament, (New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1914), p. 19.

of this belief insofar as its development can be plotted in temporal sequence.

Another question that has been left out of consideration is that of the place of the thought and teachings of Jesus in this development. This should be the subject of a later study and based on the perspective herein provided. The task of extracting the teachings of Jesus from the places assigned to them and the constructions placed upon them by the early Church in the various stages of its development is exceedingly difficult and it is doubtful if a fully satisfactory solution to the problem will ever be reached.

Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that as the development advanced more and more other factors came into play to determine the various courses it should take, there is a very discernible and understandable linear development.

Period D is characterized by a more drastic reorienting of the eschatological idea which concerned itself with individual eschatology. Eternal life was contrasted with life "in the world" as a quality of life as well as immortality. This is pronounced in the Johannine writings. Hebrews approaches the problem with a Greek doctrine of two levels of being, the eternal and real in contrast to the mundane and passing which is but a shadow of the real.

In no case within the New Testament, however, is the *eschaton* lost sight of. Period D still looks forward to this hope but now in a much more formal and less vivid way. The place of the Church in this world and individual immortality become the central interests. The way is now open for the Christological changes in Christianity under the impact of Greek thought.

To summarize, the message of Jesus, whatever its intended meaning, attracted to him a group of followers (zealots?) who, like Simeon, were ardently "looking for the consolation of Israel." They interpreted his actions and teaching in the light of their eschatological hope. They saw in him and his message the signal that the time for the *eschaton* had come. Their hope rose to a feverish pitch but instead of the *eschaton* came the cross. That hope was over. For, whatever course the future was to take, that hope was not — could not be — the same again. With the resurrection experience, however, a new hope was found. Jesus was

exalted to the position from which he would come as the eschatological Son of Man.

The tradition the disciples possessed from their sojourn with him during his life they could neither forget nor deny. It must be corrected. They had misunderstood him. Perhaps because of the deed of "lawless men" as in Acts; perhaps in the inscrutable wisdom of the plan of God, Jesus' death had become a part of the eschatological program. This new supermundane hope rose to the same high pitch and left its indelible imprint on the tradition.

But with the delay of the *parousia* such a hope could not long be maintained. There must be more in the timetable yet to be fulfilled. First the world mission of the Church, then one by one various standard apocalyptic notions were seized upon to explain the Lord's delay. It may well be that Jesus had made use of these notions and many apocalyptic sayings in the Gospels may have their origin in Jesus. But such passages as the so-called "Little Apocalypse" as we now have them are the product of, and testify to, the faith of this period in the life of the Primitive Church.

Nevertheless, even so elaborate and flexible an apocalyptic scheme cannot sustain such a faith for long. Perhaps, too, other dispositions, other interests, and other influences were at work. At any rate, in some quarters there grew up a different approach to eschatology. We may call it the "Eternal Life" school. New meanings began to be found in the advent and passion of Jesus. The *eschaton* receded into the distant future and the Church began to prepare for an indefinite pilgrimage in the world. Hebrews, the Johannine Corpus (excluding, of course, the Apocalypse), and perhaps James and the Pastorals are witness to this development. As there are today, there were occasional attempts to revive the earlier apocalyptic hope. II Peter and Revelation, like Montanism later, were such attempts. But the main stream of Christian thought had already reached Greek soil, through which it was to flow to the Western world and to us.

THE GOLDEN PRIESTHOOD AND THE LEADEN STATE [1]

A Note on the Influence of a Work Sometimes Ascribed to St. Ambrose: the Sermo de Dignitate Sacerdotali

GEORGE HUNTSTON WILLIAMS

The cosmic imagery whereby Innocent III likened the Papacy to the sun and the Empire to the moon has been traced before.[2] The purpose of the present inquiry is to examine Gregory VII's scarcely less striking comparison of the *sacerdotium* to gold and the *regnum* to lead in three letters, two to Bishop Hermann of Metz and one to William the Conqueror. The comparison is made in its simplest form in the first letter to Hermann in 1076, wherein Pope Gregory in reference to Henry IV and his counsellors writes as follows:

> Perchance they imagine that the royal dignity is higher than that of bishops; but how great the difference between them is, they may learn from the difference in their origins. The former came from human lust of power; the latter was instituted by divine grace. The former constantly strives after vain glory; the latter aspires ever toward the heavenly life. Let them learn . . . how St. Ambrose in his *pastoral letter* distinguished between them. He said: "If you compare the episcopal dignity with the *splendor of kings and the crowns of princes, these are far more inferior to it than the metal lead is to splendorous gold.*" [3]

In all three letters Gregory ascribes the metallic comparison to Ambrose; and therefore we may conveniently begin with the pertinent excerpt from the Sermo which the Pope and most medieval writers called a pastoral letter, but which we know as De dignitate sacerdotali. The italicized portions of the translation below

[1] This paper was originally prepared for an Italian *miscellanea* in honor of Professor emeritus George LaPiana of Harvard Divinity School. It is in part an extended Note on one of the tractates of the Norman Anonymous. Harvard Theological Studies, XVIII, 1951.

[2] Most recently by Hugo Rahner, "Das christliche Mysterium von Sonne und Mond," reprinted in Griechische Mythen in christlicher Deutung (Zürich, 1945), pp. 175–229; Friedrich Kempf, S.J., Papsttum und Kaisertum bei Innocenz III, Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae, IX (Rome, 1954), p. 285 and the literature, n. 15.

[3] Register, iv, 2 ed. Erich Caspar, p. 295.

are the phrases which Gregory VII made famous by quotation in three letters.

With the following words Ambrose of Milan was thought to have addressed fellow bishops on some unrecorded occasion:[4]

I shall begin now . . . , sustained by divine power. And aided by the prayers of those to whom our message has reference, I shall set out upon the desired way. And as one placed, as it were, in the bosom of the confraternity of priests, I shall be addressing fellow priests.

[Of the clergy.] Hear me, most blessed fathers and most holy brethren, if ye think me worthy. Hear me, descendants of Levi, ye priestly branch, ye sanctified lineage, leaders and guides of the flock of Christ. Hear me who beseech you yet with trepidation, taking counsel for our mutual admonition and attempting to show forth the dignity of the episcopate (*episcopatus*), so that when we shall have pointed out the prerogative of this *honor*, we may demand appropriate merits. Nor are we able to fail in the task, we who know the truth in our hearts. It is indeed fitting that the episcopal (*sacerdotalis*) dignity be first understood by us and then it may be preserved by us, that the charge of the Psalmist can be refuted by us: "Nevertheless, man being in honor understandeth it not: he is like the dumb beasts that perish and is made like unto them" (49:13).

The *honor*, therefore, brethren, *and the sublimity of the episcopate cannot be attained by making it equal with anything else.*

[Of princes.] *If thou comparest it to the insignia* (*infulas*) [5] *of kings and the diadem of princes, these are by far inferior, as though thou didst compare the metal lead* (*plumbi metallum*) *to the splendor of gold, and more especially when thou seest the necks of kings and princes bowed to the knees of priests and when these rulers, having kissed the right hand* [6] *of the priests, believe themselves to be fortified by their prayers.*

[Of other laymen.] What now should I say about the lay multitude

[4] Migne, PL, 17, col. 598. The text printed here is that of Jean Mabillon based on a Limoges MS (n. 8, below). My translation is based upon a collation of this text with the Benedictine text (n. 9, below) and eight Vatican MSS: Reg. Lat. 407, ff. 77r–86r, s. IX; Vat. Lat. 266, ff. 37r–44v, s. X; Vat. Lat. 296, s. X; Vat. Lat. 282, s. XI; Vat. Lat. 289, s. XII; Pal: Lat. 591, s. XV; Vat. Lat. 1359, s. XIII; Reg. Lat. 712, s. XII–XIII. These were collated for me by Professor Chauncey E. Finch of Saint Louis University, using the resources of the Knights of Columbus Vatican Film Library. He describes the oldest Vatican MS as "a very beautiful Carolingian MS" of the early ninth century. I am greatly indebted to Professor Finch and also to Mr. Ermatinger, curator of the microfilm collection.

[5] All Vatican texts read *fulgori*. See n. 8 below.

[6] The Mabillon text, at this point inferior, reads *decretis* (decretals).

(*plebeia multitudine*)?[7] Not only was he [the bishop] deemed worthy to be placed over them by the Lord but also it was enjoined upon them by Gospel precepts that he watch over them with paternal right (*jure patrio*).

For thus certainly was it said to blessed Peter by the Lord: "Peter, lovest thou me?" And he saith, "Thou knowest, Lord, that I love thee" (John 21:15 ff.). And when this had been asked for the third time and been followed with the same answer three times, it was repeated by the Lord a third time: "Feed my sheep." The care of these sheep, this flock, not only for that time did the blessed apostle Peter take upon himself but also along with us he received them, and all of us with him received them. Wherefore, inasmuch as these sheep are handed over (*contraduntur*) to bishops to be guided (*regendae*), they are quite properly said to be subject to their guides (*rectoribus*), as we see set down in no less a place than the gleaming Gospel mandate: "The disciple is not above his master . . ." (Matthew 10:24f.).

All this you ought to know we have said, brethren, in order to show that there can be found nothing in this world more excellent than priests, nor more lofty than bishops.

The exalted view of episcopal authority expressed in this passage made the medieval ascription of the Sermo de dignitate sacerdotali to Ambrose plausible.

The withdrawal of it is the work of modern scholarship. Jean Mabillon found at Limoges an eleventh-century version of the work uniquely identified as a "Sermo Girberti [sic] philosophi, papae urbis Romae, qui cognominatus est Silvester, De informatione episcoporum." Mabillon published it among the works of Gerbert of Aurillac, using the new title, in 1676.[8] Another MS was subsequently published by the Benedictine editors of the Opera of Ambrose in 1690.[9] Migne printed the Benedictine text in one edition of the Patrologia with Ambrose, in the other edition he printed the Sermo in the Limoges text among the works of Gerbert.[10] In the meantime, in 1867 the Limoges version had also been reprinted in the Oeuvres of Gerbert by A. Olleris.[11]

[7] The Mabillon text reads *plebis*.

[8] Vetera Analecta, nova ed., p. 103.

[9] Vol. II, Appendix of suppositious works, col. 358. The apparatus refers to the Mabillon variants and to those in other MSS.

[10] PL, 17 (1875), col. 598; PL, 139 (1880), col. 169.

[11] Paris, 1867, p. 269.

The Limoges text, De informatione episcoporum, now thrice printed, differs somewhat from the Benedictine text, De dignitate sacerdotali. It may indeed represent a reworking of the latter at the hand of Gerbert when bishop of Rheims. This was suggested by Julius Harttung, who in 1876 endeavored to restore the Sermo to Ambrose.[12] Harttung called attention to the clearly episcopal status of the author and argued that it could not have been written after Gerbert ascended the papal throne; for the work, already two and a half years before, was quoted extensively as from Ambrose by Gerbert's fellow countryman, Abbo of Fleury. Moreover, certain words and the whole style, he said, suggest Ambrose and the fourth-century situation. Harttung pointed out the reference (in the sections not quoted above) to the *chlamys* of the senator, the *sericae vestes*, the *rusticus*, the *barbarus*, and such wording as: "neophytus qui nuper ad fidem ex gentilitate advenit." Somewhat later in the same journal P. Ewald confirmed Harttung's ascription to Ambrose by pointing to the specialized meaning in the Sermo of *barbarus* as "warrior," evocative of life in the fourth-century capital of the West.[13] To the evidence of Harttung and Ewald might be added the use of the phrases "divina sacrificia libat" for the Eucharistic action, and "conventicula profana." Also reflecting ancient usage, and precisely in the paragraphs translated above, are the faint echoes of phrasings from the third-century Syrian Didascalia and the fourth-century Apostolic Constitutions. In both of these, the bishop is compared to the king and his diadem with the same lofty confidence in the preëminence of the sacerdotal dignity.[14] To the internal evidence must be added the fact that all the MSS. except

[12] "Sermo de informatione episcoporum (Sermo de dignitate sacerdotali)", Neues Archiv. . . für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde, I (1876), 587.

[13] Loc. cit., IX (1883), 354. In reference to a "senator's" wearing a *chlamys*, which to the Benedictine editors indicated a forgery, since Ambrose would have been informed as to the Roman senatorial habiliments, it should be noted that the preacher undoubtedly has in mind a high military officer (*senator militum*) above the *ducenarius* and with *barbari* as his soldiers. Robert Grosse, Römische Militärgeschichte (Berlin, 1920), 119 f.

[14] Cf. Didascalia, ed. R.H. Connolly, p. 97 (= Funk, ii, 34); Constitutions, ii, v, 34. The shift from the second person plural to the second person singular in the gold-lead paragraph would further suggest that our crucial passage had been worn smooth by usage and was familiar to the audience in the didactic second person singular.

those of Limoges and Salzburg ascribe the work to Ambrose, and of these there are, in the Vatican, alone, fourteen.[15] The composition of the Sermo by Ambrose has now been accepted (without apparently any further independent inquiry) as *probable*, by Max Manitius,[16] as *plausible*, by Percy Schramm,[17] and as *proved*, by Erich Caspar.[18]

Nevertheless, despite the full or guarded endorsement by Ewald, Manitius, Schramm, and Caspar of Harttung's facile restoration to St. Ambrose of our Sermo, it certainly cannot be, in either of the two printed versions, from the hand or tongue of the orator bishop of Milan. First of all, the biblical quotations in the present state of transmission are from the Vulgate, except for Isaiah 29:13 (col. 171) which seems to be a mingling of the Vulgate and the Old Italian (cf. Ambrosiaster). More important still, the prominence in the Sermo of the problem of episcopal usurpation of churches and of simony along with the use of such terms as *archiepiscopus* indicates a period of composition or redaction later than the fourth century. Moreover, the injunction against the elevation of anybody "ex militia saeculi" to the clerical office comports ill with what we should expect from one who had himself been enthusiastically swept from service under the emperor into the chief pastoral office of the capital city of the Western Empire.

The only way in which an Ambrosian authorship can be held open as a possibility, pending a critical study of the numerous manuscripts and their transmission, would be to hypothesize the interpolation and amplification of a much shorter Sermo based upon I Timothy 3 which was subsequently converted into a mirror of bishops appropriate to an age when simony had become rampant.

It is the first part of the Sermo wherein an assembly of bishops is being addressed by a bishop as one among fellow bishops

[15] The Benedictine editors of the Opera refer in their Admonitio, col. 358, to fourteen Vatican MSS. Professor Finch (n. 4, above) has located twelve. Pertz mentions a copy in Salzburg ascribed to Sylvester II. Archiv für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde, IX (1847), 482.

[16] Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters, II, 1923, 742.

[17] Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio, II, 1929, 11, n. 1.

[18] Geschichte des Papsttums, II, 1933, 71. H-X, Arquillière noncommittally ascribes the Sermo to "Ambrosiaster." S. Grégoire VII, 1933, 275, n. 1.

(*consacerdotes*) that could be most easily fitted into late fourth-century Italy. And it is from this part that our large Excerpt above is taken. In the last three chapters of both the Benedictine and Mabillon texts, the *sermo* turns palpably into a *libellus* against gross simony and the plurals of direct address become the singulars of close argumentation.

Even this alteration of Harttung's thesis is only suggestive. But surely he was right that the original Sermo is older than the period of Gerbert, as the early ninth-century Vatican MS (Reg. Lat. 407) testifies. He was also right in observing that the absence of patristic and canonistic citation and the solely scriptural argumentation of even the interpolated Sermo and the application of the Petrine passages of Matthew and John to all bishops and not merely to the successor of Peter in Rome point to the age of Ambrose and Ambrosiaster.

It will therefore be useful, by way of comparison, to examine the known views of Ambrose on episcopal authority with the Excerpt from the Sermo quoted above which deals with sacerdotal dignity.

From the undisputed works we know that Ambrose had an exalted view of the episcopate and that, while respectful of the Roman see and its Petrine succession, he was not one to derogate from the dignity of the bishop of the imperial capital of the West. The Bishop of Milan held high the episcopal office as *priestly*, in succession to the apostles and Aaron; *prophetic*, in succession to Elijah and Nathan. Ambrose was conscious of wearing the prophetic mantle of Nathan when he rebuked orthodox Theodosius and of Elijah when he excoriated the Arian Valentinian and the empress mother "Jezebel." [19]

Ambrose, we know, expressly derived the commission of every apostle from the Triune authority, the Father, the Son (Christ in the case of Peter in John 21:15 f.), or the Holy Spirit (in the case of Paul and all bishops, quoting Acts 20:28).[20] Ambrose

[19] The prophetic consciousness of Ambrose I have pointed out in "Christology and Church-State Relationships in the Fourth Century," Church History, XX (1951): 4, p. 9.

[20] De Spiritu sancto, ii, 13 (145 ff.); PL. XVI, col. 805. Cf. Expositio Lucae, vi, 22: "Ergo nec Petrus ipse, quia *ecclesia* dilexit in Petro, nec Paulus ipse, quia Paulus quoque eius est portio." CSEL, XXXII, 3, p. 240, 12 f.

emphatically asserted that Paul is not inferior to Peter in the apostolate, that he is "second to none." [21] And in interpreting Matthew 16:18, Ambrose singled out Peter's *faith* rather than his having been *first* as determinative and he held that it was *representatively* [22] that Peter responded to Jesus' Transfiguration inquiry "*pro caeteris apostolis*, imo prae caeteris . . . quia novit non solum proprium sed etiam commune servare." Therefore, Ambrose concluded, faith is the effectual foundation of the Church.[23] Other references in the undisputed writings of Ambrose to Peter, though also respectful of the see of Rome, fail to press Petrine primacy to the disparagement of the episcopate in general.[24]

On the question of Petrine authority of the bishop our Sermo reflects a view similar to that of Ambrose. In the Excerpt given above, the Preacher arranges Christian society in three ranks, namely, priests, princes, and the people.

[21] De Spiritu sancto, ii, 13 (158); PL, XVI, 808. Ambrose's vindication of the coördinate apostolic authority of *Paul* and Peter is similar to that of Ambrosiaster who went even further, arguing against Damasus for a "primacy" for each of the apostles. Noted by Joseph Ludwig, Die Primatworte Mt. 16, 18. 19 in der altkirchlichen Exegese, Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen, XIX: 4 (Münster, 1952), 65. Cf. Quaestiones, ed. A. Souter, CSEL, L, p. 135, lines 15 f.: "manifestum est in Petro omnes contineri."

[22] De incarnationis sacramento, iv, (33); col. 862. Cf. also Expositio psalmi 38, 37: ". . . quod Petro dicitur, apostolis dicitur." CSEL, LXIV, 213, 3.

[23] De incarnationis sacramento, v, (34); PL, XVI, 862: Fides. . . ergo est ecclesiae fundamentum: non enim de carne Petri, sed de fide dictum est. . . . Ibid., (33); 861: [Petrus] statim loci non immemor sui primatum confessionis utique, non honoris; primatum fidei, non ordinis. Expositio Lucae, vi, 98 f.; CSEL: 3, 275: Petra tua actus est, petra tua mens est. supra hanc petram aedificatur domus tua, ut nullis possit nequitiae spiritalis euerberari procellis. petra tua fides est, fundamentum et fides ecclesiae. si in ecclesia fueris, in ecclesia eris, quia ecclesia supra petram est.

[24] As indicative of his respect for the apostolic see of the West, one might quote De virginitate, xvi (105); PL, 306; Ep. XI, 4; col. 986; Ep. XLII, 5; col. 1174. Somewhat more "Roman" are the following places: De excessu fratris sui, i, 47, where "catholic" bishops are understood as those in communion with the Roman see; De fide, iv, 57, which is primarily christological rather than ecclesiological in intent; and De poenitentia, against the Novatianists, possibly in Rome, where Ambrose writes, i, 7 (33): ". . . non habent enim Petri haereditatem, qui Petri sedem [some MSS though generally inferior have *fidem*] non habent." The most important passage in respect to papal authority is in Explanatio psalmi 40, CSEL, LXIV, 250, 19: ". . . ubi Petrus, ibi ecclesia." But J. Ludwig, who has most recently reviewed the evidence, while insisting that Ambrose consciously opposed the extremism of Cyprian and Ambrosiaster, concludes that the Bishop of Milan repudiated any Dominical basis for the *jurisdictional* primacy of the successors of Peter. Op. cit., 67.

The first rank, preëminently the bishops, were commonly called in this period *sacerdotes*, before the sacerdotal function had been fully delegated to presbyters.[25] The sacerdotal right is derived emphatically from the Apostle Peter, and calculatingly from the Resurrection authorization in John 21 rather than from the pre-Transfiguration institution of Petrine authority in Matthew 16. Peter accepts, according to our Excerpt from the Sermo, the sheep from Christ along with all subsequent bishops; indeed, with Peter the whole episcopate was present, receiving proleptically what Peter at that time assumed personally.[26] The author of the Sermo seems to have a special reason for emphasizing the threefold character of the Johannine account, the *thrice*-posed question, the *thrice*-asseverated love, and the consequent bestowal of authority to rule the flock by virtue of this intensity of love toward the resurrected Christ as distinguished from the virtue, in the Matthaean account, of recognizing in Jesus the Christ of faith.[27] The emphasis upon episcopal love in the De dignitate sacerdotali, notably in connection with the threefold expression of it by Peter, is paralleled by an important distinction Ambrose is known to have made prominent in using the same Johannine text in his Exposition of Luke.[28] Here Ambrose distinguishes between Peter's *amor* and *dilectio* for Christ and is thereby the first of the Fathers to differentiate significantly between the *agapan* of Christ's first two queries and the *philein* of his last.[29] In the Exposition Ambrose defines *dilectio* as the love of the soul, *amor* as the ardent love of both mind and body, and he says that when Christ was satisfied that Peter loved in spirit, soul and flesh,[30] he granted him not

[25] I have written somewhat more on the place of Ambrose in the history of the priesthood in H. Richard Niebuhr, ed., The Ministry in Historical Perspective (New York, 1956), chs. ii, iii.

[26] "Quas oves, quem gregem non solum tunc beatus suscepit apostolus Petrus; sed et nobiscum eas accepit, et cum illo eas suscipimus [Limoges text and Reg. Lat. 407; some other texts: accepimus] omnes."

[27] In Expositio, x, 91 the threefold expression of love is construed as compensation for the denials of Christ before the Resurrection. CSEL, XXXII; 3. The same in De sacramentis, ii, 21.

[28] PL, XV, 1942; CSEL, XXXII, 524.

[29] Cf. J. H. Bernard, A Critical Commentary. . . to St. John (Edinburgh, 1928), II, 702.

[30] A threefold division of the faculties or wills in man was widely accepted in antiquity.

only the task of tending and feeding lambs (*agnos*) but also of feeding mature sheep (*oves*). Ambrose thus suggests in the Exposition, as does the author of the Sermo, that the superiority of the *apostolus-sacerdos-episcopus* resides in his superior love and devotion to the Lord.

Below the clergy in the pseudepigraphic Sermo stand the kings and princes who are unfavorably compared as lead to gold and are beheld, from within the bosom of the sacerdotal fraternity, as abject figures whose only hope of efficacy in prayer seems to be through submitting their necks at the knees of priests and in kissing the hands of bishops.[31]

Below the magistrates stand the *plebeia multitudo*, the faithful multitude expressly entrusted as of paternal right to the rule of the bishops by Gospel command.

A tripartite Christian society is only adumbrated here, but it is worth mentioning. Of special interest is the sense of tremendous spiritual distance separating Christian *sacerdotes* from even the royal and princely faithful, marked by the striking contrast between gold and lead.

Lead is the basest of the classical series of seven metals, gold the noblest. Undoubtedly it is within this context that our Preacher is thinking of extremes of dullness and brightness, ignobility and superiority; for surely outside of this context he could have conjured up more striking extremes. Gold was the noblest in the ancient metallic series corresponding to the series of seven heavenly bodies ranging from the golden Sun to leaden Saturn. To be sure, the Preacher's contrasting of the priests as golden and the princes as leaden could have been made casually and without any more force than had he said "gleaming" and "livid,"[32] but in view of the immemorial cycle of metallic symbolism in antiquity, it is quite possible that the Preacher intended to evoke for

[31] The phrasing may echo in "verumtamen praesulibus rerum divinarum devotus *colla submittis*" in Duo quippe sunt addressed by Pope Gelasius to the Emperor Anastasius.

[32] For example, Petronius Arbiter says of one who is clearly the child of Fortune: "In manu illius aurum plumbum fiebat." Satiricon, 43. Lead had occasionally a harmful or sinister connotation in antiquity. Lead was employed metallurgically in the refining of gold. O. Gruppe, Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte, II, 1906, 1113, n. 3. Cf. also p. 876, n. 5 and p. 1037, n. 5.

his sacerdotal congregation a sense of the cosmic and mystical distance between priests and princes.

If it was within this context, familiar to his hearers, that the Preacher was thinking of extremes of brightness and dullness, he would have had in mind, for example, the fact that Mithraism knew of seven metallic portals through which the soul had to pass. The first portal of lead was symbolized astrally by Saturn, and the last, of gold, was symbolized by and sometimes thought to derive from the Sun. Origen, among the Fathers, refers to this metallic symbolism in the cult of Mithras.[33]

It is quite possible also that the Preacher had in mind still another Eastern scheme of thinking in which four metals, three or four ranks of society, the four seasons and three, four, five, or seven ages of the world were linked and thought to begin or end or both begin and end in a golden age. In the Babylonian-Persian-Mithraic series the day and millennium ruled by the sun represented a climax in the cycle, but the age of Saturn was likewise regarded as the age of peace, longevity, and simple satisfactions. This scheme was in conflict with another myth according to which the first age was golden. Efforts at harmonization do not completely eliminate the incongruence.

Clement of Alexandria, commenting on the tripartite society envisaged by Plato,[34] and symbolized by gold, silver, and bronze,

[33] Contra Celsum, vi, 22. PG, 11, 1324. The full Mithraic list reads lead, tin, bronze, iron, alloy, silver, gold. This list differs slightly from another one common in antiquity. See on both, Fr. Cumont, "La Fin du monde selon les mages occidentaux," Revue de l'histoire des religions, CIII (1931), esp. p. 52 and J. Daniélou, "La typologie millénariste de la semaine dans le christianisme primitif," Vigiliae Christianae, II (1948), pp. 1 ff. On the sevenfold astral-chemical scheme of ancient religious, psychological, and later alchemical significances see further O. Schrader, Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte, 3rd ed., II:1. 1906, Die Metalle; J. Brandis, "Die Bedeutung der sieben Thore Thebens," Hermes, II, 1867, 17; R. Reitzenstein and H. Schaeder, Studien zum antiken Synkretismus aus Iran und Griechenland, I (Berlin, 1926), esp. pp. 67 f; 228, n.; Edmund O. von Lippmann, Entstehung und Ausbreitung der Alchemie, II (Berlin, 1931), 67 ff. and literature.

[34] Plato makes threefold and socially contemporaneous what for Hesiod was five- (four-) fold and epochal. Of Hesiod's five successive ages, four of them were symbolized by metals, the first being the Golden Age, the last the Iron Age. The fourth, the Heroic Age without a metallic symbol, has been shown to be an interpolation. The five ages reappear in Ovid's Metamorphoses, I, 89 ff. In commenting on Plato's Timaeus, Proclus Diodachus (ed. E. Diehl, I, 43) mentions four metals and their astral counterparts: gold, silver, lead (Kronos), and iron.

Cf. also the four metallic "men" in the dream of the third-century Alexandrian

remarked that this may have been a prophecy of Christian polity as spiritual, hence golden in an historic climax which construed the Jewish polity as silver and that of the Gentiles as brass. After quoting from Plato's Republic on how God in peopling the *politeia*, mixed gold with those fit to rule, silver with the military, iron and copper with the farmers and artisans (iii. 415A), Clement goes on to quote him at a point further on (v, 479E): "Whence it has necessarily come to pass that some embrace and *love* those things which are objects of knoweldge, and others those which are matters of opinion." Thereupon Clement observes:

> . . . perhaps he is prophesying of that elect nature which desires knowledge; unless in assuming three natures, he, as some supposed, is describing three forms of polity: that of the Jews, silver; that of the Greeks, the third; and that of the Christians in whom there has been infused the *royal gold, the Holy Spirit.*[35]

It will be noted that Clement makes love the basis and mark of participation in the highest polity and connects this with the Holy Spirit, as golden and regal. Like Clement, the author of the Sermo connects the highest form of rulership with love (*thrice* asseverated by Peter, for example) and the Holy Spirit.

Somewhat differently Lactantius sought to assimilate the Golden Age of Stoicism and the modified astral millennialism of Hystaspes to Christian thought by claiming that through the abandonment of polytheism and the acceptance of the true wisdom of the one God of the Church "the Golden Age will at once return to you." [36]

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alchemist Zosimus. M. Berthelot, Collections des anciens alchimistes grecs (Paris, 1888), II, iii; cf. the Serpent, II, 22.

[35] Stromata, v. 14, 98; PG, 9, col. 145; O. Stählin, II, 390 f.; copied out by Eusebius in Praeparatio Evangelica, xiii, 13; E. Gifford, ed., II, 268 f. See Harry Wolfson, Philo, II, p. 431. Philo himself frequently interprets gold metaphorically, e.g., Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum (Armenian), ed. Ralph Marcus, Loeb Library, Philo, Supplement II, esp. p. 102.

[36] Divine Institutes, v, 6; 8; Epitome, XX (25); CSEL, XIX, pp. 418; 421; 691. For the most recent literature on the Golden Age, see "aetas aurea," Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum, II (1950). On Lactantius' use of Hystaspes, see Cumont, loc. cit., pp. 67, 93.

The extent to which Ambrose drew upon the classical imagery of the Golden Age is admirably documented by Arthur O. Lovejoy, "The Communism of St. Ambrose," Journal of the History of Ideas, III (1942), 458–68.

II

The Preacher's contrast between priestly rule as golden and the regiment of princes as leaden was destined to expand in meaning and applicability, notably in the Gregorian Age.

But already in the ninth century, and quite apart from our particular text, Rabanus Maurus had added to the spiritual significance of gold and contributed also to the denigration of lead. Going beyond Isidore, who in his Etymologies had summarized the lore of the ancients, e.g., Pliny, on this point, Rabanus Maurus was at pains to explore the Bible to discover also the higher significance of gold and fine gold (*obryzum*). He found that it betokens spiritual discernment of Scriptures,[37] a capacity grounded in the highest of the three Christian virtues, love, and hence the greatest of the *seven* virtues. He advanced in support of his interpretation Psalm 44 (45), which had been traditionally construed as an epithalamium of Christ and his Church under the type of the marriage of Solomon and the daughter of Pharaoh. The Church as gold-adorned queen is the embodiment of this love in verse 10 (9): "Astitit regina a dextris tuis in vestitu deaurato: circumdata varietate." Although Rabanus Maurus was more factual in his account of lead, he here too assigned a moral meaning. By slightly changing the grammar of a sentence on the gravity of lead, copied from Isidore, Rabanus was able to add that lead symbolizes that ultimately burdensome cupidity for worldly things which oppresses the avaricious.[38]

Although the lucubrations of Rabanus Maurus were not originally connected with our Sermo text, they may well have passed into the stream of associations which, when the gold-lead passage came to be widely quoted in the Gregorian Age, intensified its

[37] "Aurum splendorem sapientiae, vel intellectum spiritualem sacrarum Scripturarum, vel charitatis eminentiam significare potest. . . ." De universo, xvii, 12; PL, CXI, col. 475.

The In Apocalypsin expositio of one Berengaudus, composed possibly in the ninth century, also recognizes that gold often signifies wisdom. PL, XVII, coll. 997B, 1037A, 1040C. It does so, interestingly, in connection with identifying Christ as the foundation of the Church along with the twelve apostles, Peter being no more important than the others. On Berengaudus, see Antonio Romeo, Enciclopedia Cattolica, II, 1949, 1377.

[38] Loc. cit., col. 479. Isidore, Etymologiarum, xvi, 22, ed. W. Lindsay, II.

coloration. It was not, however, the gold-lead passage that first attracted attention in the eleventh century, when the Sermo de dignitate sacerdotali began to be cited and excerpted. Abbot Abbo of Fleury, Gerbert as bishop of Rheims, and Cardinal Humbert [39] seemed to have been interested in other aspects of the Sermo.

Abbo (†1004), in fact, quite purposively passed over the gold-lead passage and the allusion to a tripartite society connected with it. This may be because the Abbot had his own view of a Christian society in which monks rather than bishops represent the highest of the three ranks. It is clear that Abbo had before him the whole "Ambrosian" Sermo from which he quoted in his Apologeticus; for, although the express quotation is only a portion of chapter V,[40] the influence of the whole Sermo is detectible in the Apologeticus both in its structure and its polemical tendency. Bishop "Ambrose" had exalted the episcopate at the expense of the *regnum*. Abbot Abbo, in contrast, in appealing to Hugh Capet and his royal son Robert against a local bishop (of unusual violence in his attempt to press episcopal jurisdiction over Fleury), honors godly kings. Abbo exerts himself, however, to depress the episcopate below the rank of the monastic clergy. In doing this he alludes to the same Psalm (49:13) quoted by "Ambrose." [41] Christian society, according to Abbo, insofar as it is male,[42] consists of three orders or grades (*ordines, gradus*); the first, good; the second, better; and the third, the best. These are laymen, consisting of *agricolae, agonistae*, and *principes;* clerics, consisting of deacons, presbyters, and bishops; and finally the best of all, monks.

The monastic fraternity, in anticipation of Joachim of Flora, is the highest rank or order because here Christian love for God and withdrawal from the world find their purest exemplifications. The monastic rank is indeed comparable to that of the philosophers in Plato's Republic (although, of course, the connection is

[39] Sigebertus, monk of Gembloux, may also have known the Sermo to which he refers, in his Apologia, c. 1074/5. Cf. Libelli de Lite, II, 441, 12 ff. and Sackur's note.

[40] Migne, PL, 139, 46. Coll. 446C f. is quoted expressly from the Sermo, coll. 174C f.

[41] See opening Excerpt above (Of bishops) and cf. Apologeticus, col. 465D.

[42] Women he also divides into three ranks: the married, the widowed or continent, and the virgins or betrothed.

not stated); for the *vita monastica*, in keeping with the ancient tradition of esteeming monasticism as the true philosophy, is described as a *laboriosum spiritualis philosophiae otium.*[43] The Pythagorean-Platonic-Stoic idea of a Golden Age in which *love* among friends constitutes the basis for the superior status of the communal life passed into the thinking of Western monasticism by several channels, among them the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals.[44] Embodied in Epistle V of Clement of Rome (and reworked in the decretal De communi vita ascribed to Urban) Golden Age communism embedded in the Pseudo-Clementines and the agapic communism of the primitive Jerusalemite church recorded in Acts were combined in such a way as to impart to the monkish *milites Christi*, possessing nothing in their own *individual* right, the conviction that they represented the superior caste of the Christian *res publica.*

Below the monks in Abbo's scheme are the secular clerics who, involved in the world, yet concerned with higher things, stand midway between monks and laymen. It is of interest that Abbo quotes Christ's words of institution to Peter (Matthew 18) to prove precisely that the Church is Christ's, not Peter's: " 'Meam,' inquit, non 'tuam'." [45] And after quoting Psalm 92:5 in further proof, Abbo goes on to ask: "Si ergo ecclesia non est Petri, cuius erit? aut successores Petri audebunt potestatem sibi vindicare, quam non habuit Petrus princeps ecclesiae?" "Ambrose" did not even mention Matthew 18 in his Sermo and likewise ignored the papal implications of the Petrine passage of John 21 which he adduced instead to enhance the dignity of *all* bishops apostolic. The social theory of the Sermo and Abbo are, of course, divergent. Abbo is expressly objecting to the view represented by his adversary, the bishop of Orleans (Arnulf), who makes bold to say "this church is mine, another his," when the theological truth is that all local churches are Christ's. Abbo then goes on, appealing

[43] Loc. cit. col. 461, 464; cf. ep. viii. Cf. Ernst Kantorowicz, Die Wiederkehr gelehrter Anachorese (Stuttgart, 1937), where it is pointed out how the ancient connection between the robed philosopher and the Christian hermit finds notable expression in Abelard.

[44] Hans von Schubert, Der Kommunismus der Wiedertäufer in Münster und seine Quellen, Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, SB, philos.-hist. Kl., X:11 (1919).

[45] Loc. cit., col. 465; cf. ep. xiv, col. 441.

to the *clarissimi principes*, to deplore also that conception of ownership in which the altar is said to belong to the bishop, and the edifice as a whole to some lord. It is in this connection that he then quotes from the Sermo where Ambrose supposedly excoriates simony. Abbo is quite prepared to use a bishop against bishops! Only against episcopal authority did Abbo exploit his above mentioned view of Matthew 18 in the Apologeticus. Sent to Rome somewhat later (997) on the matter of Robert II's consanguineous marriage, Abbo became in the end a powerful spokesman of the papal position, having been won over at Spoleto by Gregory V.

Of the so-called Limoges (or Mabillon) version of the Sermo by Gerbert of Aurillac there is nothing tendentious in the reworking to note in connection with the theme we are here tracing. (Cf. the variant readings in the section upon which we are concentrating, above notes 6 and 7.) And we pass directly to the third writer who uses the Sermo of "Ambrose," Cardinal Humbert (†1061). Humbert's concern, like Abbo's, was to bring in "Ambrose" as an ancient witness against simony and accordingly he quoted a couple of columns from him in the Adversus Simoniacos.[46] The monk of Moyenmoutier did not see fit to include the gold-lead passage and its implications for the superiority of the episcopate.

III

From the three pre-Gregorian writers Abbo, Gerbert, and Humbert we return to the monkish pope, Gregory VII himself, who picked up precisely that portion of the "Ambrosian" Sermo which glittered with metallic symbolism, and in the three letters, of which mention was made at the outset, effectively used the contrast between the golden priesthood and the leaden state. This he did in the two letters to Bishop Hermann of Metz, Aug. 25, 1076,[47] and March 15, 1081,[48] and in the little-noticed closing epistle of the Register, that to William the Conqueror, toward the end of 1083.[49]

[46] I, 16; PL, 143, coll. 1040–2 = De dignitate, PL, 139, coll. 174–6.
[47] Quoted above, p. 37; Register, iv, 2; ed., E. Caspar, 293.
[48] Ibid., viii, 21; p. 544.
[49] Ibid., ix, 37; p. 630.

In the first letter to Hermann already quoted Gregory used just the gold-lead phrase from what he calls the Pastoral [Letter] of Ambrose.[50] Earlier in his letter Gregory appeals to Ambrose as the rebuker of Theodosius and cites the Pasce oves (John 21) which, it will be recalled, had not been used in a papal sense in the Sermo itself. But there is no evidence that Gregory knows the "Pastoral" as a whole. He is here undoubtedly dependent upon "places" supplied by his canonists.

In the second and much longer letter to Hermann, Gregory is emboldened to enlarge the quotation from "Ambrose" to include, linked with the metallic image, the phrase which pictures the necks of kings bowed before priestly knees. (The whole of the Sermo phrasing copied by Gregory in the second letter is italicized in the opening Excerpt.) The daring originality of Gregory is to be seen in combining the Two Powers passage of Pope Gelasius with the Two Metals passage of the Sermo, and connecting them by reference to Ambrose's rebuke of Theodosius and the Pope's deposition of the last of the Merovingians as "non utilis."[51] From now on precisely this combination of phrasing and "places" will be a favorite for excerpting by canonists.

Before going on to discuss the third letter of Gregory, it will be perhaps well to mention here the decretalists' use of this central section of Gregory's epochal second letter.

Possibly the first to quote Gregory's second letter to Hermann of Metz was Anselm of Lucca, who embodies copious selections including the whole of the core section with its characteristically Gregorian combination of Gelasius and "Ambrose." This was in Anselm's Collectio canonum of c. 1083.[52] The next to quote the letter seems to have been the anonymous author of the Liber canonum contra Henricum quartum of c. 1085.[53] He confines himself to the gold-lead passage, leaving out the necks-knees portion of the Sermo quotation, but though his quotation is truncated, it is clear that he is copying the second and not the earlier

[50] Loc. cit., 296, 41–4.

[51] Loc. cit., 553, ff.

[52] In i, c. 80; ed. F. Thaner, 55; for the date, Fournier and G. Le Bras, Histoire des Collections canoniques, II, 1932, 28.

[53] Libelli de lite, (henceforth L.d.l.) I, 492, 30 ff.

letter of Gregory to Hermann.[54] The next to include the core passage of Gregory's second letter is Cardinal Deusdedit in his Collectio canonum, composed between 1083 and 1087.[55] Here the Gelasian portion of the core passage of the letter is dropped, but the whole of the "Ambrosian" portion appears intact (the italicized parts of my opening translation). Since Deusdedit feels it to the point to quote copiously from the letter as a whole, it is all the more significant that the Gelasian Duo quippe sunt is dropped. The Cardinal employs the same Ambrosian portion of the core passage again in his Contra invasores et simoniacos, after 1087.[56] The next canonist to quote Gregory and now the whole core passage (Gelasius-"Ambrose") is Ivo of Chartres, first in the Decretum of c. 1094 [57] and then without any abridgment in the Panormia.[58] Finally, the whole of the core passage appears in Gratian's Decretum.[59] It is followed by c. xi, a quotation from Pope John VIII: "Si imperator catholicus est . . . *filius* est, *non presul* ecclesiae; quod ad religionem conpetit *discere* ei convenit, non *docere* . . . . Imperatores christiani *subdere* debent exsecutiones suas ecclesiasticis praesulibus, *non praeferre*." [60]

I have gone on to quote a portion of this second decretal adduced by Gratian because it will be of some interest as we turn back now, from the canonistic excerpting of Gregory's second letter to Hermann, to a consideration of that third letter in which for the third time Gregory adduced the Ambrosian gold-lead passage in favor of sacerdotal authority, this time in his carefully worded letter to William the Conqueror at the end of 1083.[61]

This epistle has received very little attention because, apart from the opening paragraph with its diplomatic and yet perhaps also personal expression of esteem and affection for the Conqueror, the letter contains little that could not be found in others

[54] This is demonstrable from the fact that he includes the phrase "nullis potest comparationibus adequari", which is left out in the first letter to Hermann.

[55] In iii, 184; ed. V. Glanvell, I, p. 490, 25–491, 8; for the date, Fournier and Le Bras, op. cit., II, 38.

[56] L. d. l., II, 292, 30 ff.

[57] In v, 478; PL, 161, col. 438; for the date, Fournier and Le Bras, op. cit. II, 82.

[58] In v, 109; PL, 131, 1235 f.

[59] Pars, i, D 96, c. x; ed. E. Friedberg, I, 340 f.

[60] Italics for subsequent reference.

[61] See above, n. 49.

of the Gregorian Register. Moreover, it survives without its conclusion. It was apparently never answered by William, and its counsel was surely never heeded. A letter dealing with the same matter addressed by Gregory to his great ally, Archbishop Hugh of Lyons, is known only from a fragment.[62] Nevertheless Gregory's letter to William is important, because what he had hitherto said to a bishop, he now made bold to repeat to a king, to a conqueror, indeed, who had once carried the papal banner in an epochal exploit.

The occasion of the letter was William's summary arrest of his half brother Odo, bishop of Bayeux, earl of Kent. The most vivid account of this almost unprecedented assault upon the episcopal dignity is that of Ordericus Vitalis; [63] but recollections of William's personal seizure of his own brother, when his barons hesitated to comply with his order, are found in most of the chronicles of the period.[64] According to Ordericus Vitalis, the allegedly treasonable Odo, in the tense scene depicted, expostulated with his half brother: "I am a cleric and a minister of God; none has the right to condemn a bishop without the judgment of the Pope." William retorted in the famous words: "It is not the cleric I condemn, nor the bishop, but the earl, my vassal, whom I made vicegerent in my kingdom." Some scholars, for example, Leopold Delisle,[65] have detected tendentious composition on the part of Ordericus in portraying Odo. Joseph de Crozals [66] purports to have discovered the historic kernel of the memorable speeches placed on brothers' lips during the tense encounter in the earlier counsel of Archbishop Lanfranc who had many reasons to resent the earl of Kent, the usurper of the place he had himself formerly occupied next the king. According to William of Malmesbury, it was the king himself who in deliberating with Lanfranc raised

[62] P. Jaffé, ed., Monumenta Gregoriana, 1865, p. 570, No. 44.

[63] Hist. Eccl. vii; ed. Bouquet, 12, 614.

[64] The fullest modern account is that of V. Bourrienne, "Odon de Conteville, évêque de Bayeux: son rôle au début de la première Croisade," which was serialized in Revue catholique de Normandie, the especially helpful instalment for the present purpose being, VIII (1898), 506. Cf. Sarell Gleason, An Ecclesiastical Barony of the Middle Ages: The Bishopric of Bayeux, 1066–1204 (Cambridge, Mass. 1936), p. 17.

[65] "Notice sur Orderic Vital", Orderici Vitalis Historiae ecclesiasticae, iv; cf. Bourrienne, loc. cit., 517, n.3.

[66] Lanfranc, archévêque de Cantorbéry, 1877, pp. 252 f.

the question of the propriety of laying hands on a bishop however treasonable, whereupon the archbishop provided the troubled king with the helpful distinction: "It is not the bishop of Bayeux whom you will be laying hands upon but the earl of Kent whom you will imprison." [67] It is also the view of de Crozals that on the charges of sacrilege, immorality, and many other improprieties of Odo as ecclesiastic, the chroniclers exaggerated to justify William's seizure of the treacherous earl. Bourrienne goes perhaps even further in vindicating Odo as *churchman*.

Gregory must have been in possession of some details about Odo's moral and ecclesiastical life. Ordericus reports, indeed, that the Bishop of Bayeux had acquired a magnificent residence in Rome.[68] If a partial rehabilitation of Odo as bishop is sound, the restrained indignation of Gregory in his defense seems more plausible than otherwise. Gregory's rebuke of William and his bold arguments in defense of the episcopate including the gold-lead passage from "Ambrose" should be before us at this point. After expressing his special esteem and affection for the king above all others and confidence in the continued glory of his reign, Gregory goes on to the vexatious matter of the arrest:

Yet, in the meantime, what you have done touches me, and in touching me it oppresses me and turbulently beclouds the joy I have in the heart which loves you for the distinguished record of your royal virtues. For now, seizing your brother, a bishop, with no regard to your reputation, as would have been fitting, but with preference for worldly security and human expedience over divine law, you have heeded less carefully the respect due a priest. And yet we are certain that in your wisdom you are not ignorant of that scriptural injunction which is to be understood with special reference to priests: "Who toucheth you, toucheth the pupil of mine eye" [Zech. 2:8] and elsewhere: "Touch not my *christi*" [I Chron. 16:22], nor unmindful of the fact that the Lord himself did not scorn to confer official dignity upon priests though wicked and quite unworthy. Understanding this, Constantine of pious memory, a man of distinction, the Emperor, of course, would accept at the Nicene Council no charge against bishops even when made by bish-

[67] Gesta Regum, iv, 306; Rolls Series, XC; (1889), 361; copied by Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, LVII:2 (1847), 26.

[68] Odo had hopes of succeeding Gregory as Pope, partly on the strength of a prophecy that an Odo would ascend the throne of Peter.

ops themselves, nor did he presume to pass judgment upon them, saying: "Ye have been constituted gods by the true God; therefore, it is not proper for us human beings to presume to judge gods." [69] How great indeed is the dignity of the priesthood and the sublimity of the episcopate, let blessed Ambrose, that unquestionably illustrious teacher, inform you in your greatness and instruct you in your sagacity, when he writes as follows in his *Pastoral*: "The honor . . . ."

Here follows the famous gold-lead passage, but thereupon the letter breaks off,[70] and we do not know whether Gregory chose to include the remainder of the quotation from the Sermo on the necks of kings and princes humbled at the knees of priests. But enough had already been said, despite the very gracious opening paragraph, to anger William. And in any event William kept his brother in prison up to the end. Even when, at the approach of death, William granted amnesty to political prisoners, the bishop of Bayeux was expressly excluded. Whether a final importuning on the part of Robert de Mortain was successful is debated.[71]

Since William did not reply to the Pope and since Archbishop Hugh of Lyons left no trace of a response to Gregory's letter to him on the matter of Odo's arrest, the gold-lead letter has seemed to have been a pebble cast without ripples [72] of Anglo-Norman repercussion reaching us from so long ago.

IV

It now appears, however, that we have from the pen of an anonymous prelate of the cathedral of Rouen an indirect response to Pope Gregory's reprimand of William the Conqueror. Among the thirty-one ecclesio-political tracts and fragments which Hein-

[69] This goes back to Rufinus, HE, i, ii which in turn is based on Ex. 22: 28, Ps. 82:1, and John 10:34. See the recent discussion by Ernst Kantorowicz, "Deus per naturam, deus per gratiam", XLV (1952), esp. p. 173. Gregory VII makes the same reference to Constantine's deference to bishops as gods in the other two letters we have been considering: iv, 2; p. 296, 4 ff. by allusion and directly in viii, 21: p. 553, 7 ff.

[70] "Hier endet der Text ohne jedes Interpunktionszeichen." E. Caspar, ed. p. 631.

[71] The problem and sources are discussed by Bourrienne, loc. cit., 526 ff.

[72] Augustin Fliche barely notes the episode in his three-volume treatment, La Réforme Grégorienne, II, 1925, 6 and 16. The letter is not mentioned by H.-X. Arquillière, op. cit., nor by E. Voosen, Papauté et pouvoir civil à l'époque de Grégoire VIII, 1927.

rich Böhmer first called the "York Tractates" [73] and which I have recently restudied and ascribed to a Norman Anonymous of 1100 A.D. with the partly substantiated conjecture that the author was in fact Archbishop William Bona Anima of Rouen (1079–1111) [74] is one (J10), De potestate sacerdotali et regia,[75] which embodies views inconsonant with those of the other tractates. My first explanation of the appearance of this extremely Gregorian fragment among the works of the royalist Anonymous was that it represents a leaf taken from the crucial section of some Gregorian writing (or a summary thereof) which had aroused the Anonymous to compose his most important tractate (J24), De consecratione pontificum et regum.[76] Further study, some of the findings of which have already been here set down, now makes it possible to be more explicit.

The fragmentary De potestate sacerdotali et regia begins with the first sentence of the famous Duo sunt and ends with a paraphrase of the gold-lead passage, without, however, naming either Gelasius or Ambrose. From Böhmer on, no scholar including myself, has hitherto noticed the similarity between this fragment and the canonistic summaries of the second letter of Gregory to Hermann of Metz. However, it is better than any of these, because, compressed into a few lines without direct quota-

[73] Tractatus Eboracenses. Five of the most important of the tractates were published in L. d. l., III, and several more in Kirche und Staat in England und der Normandie, 1899, in which the "Anonymous of York" was discussed at length as an extreme royalist. Still more of the tracts were published and discussed by Harold Scherrinsky, Untersuchungen zum sogenannten Anonymus von York, 1939. The unique source is a codex preserved at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, N. 415.

[74] The Norman Anonymous of 1100 A.D.: Toward the Identification and Evaluation of the So-Called Anonymous of York, Harvard Theological Studies, XVIII, 1951. In the Appendix are published the remainder of the hitherto unedited tracts and fragments of the codex, including J10, p. 223.

[75] The homogeneity of the collection and sole authorship of its contents with exception of J10 was demonstrated independently by H. Scherrinsky, op. cit., by P. Lapparent, "Un précurseur de la Réforme anglaise: l'Anonyme de York, Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age, XV (1946), 149, and by myself, in 1946/51. All three studies were directed against Philipp Funk, "Der fragliche Anonymus von York," Historisches Jahrbuch, LV (1935), 251. Fr. Pelster, S.J., in a long review of my book, sees no objection to including even J10 among the writings of the Anonymous! Theologische Revue, XLVIII (1952), coll. 156–158.

[76] See The Norman Anonymous, pp. 35 f. J10 is printed pp. 223 f. J24 is edited by H. Böhmer, III, 662 ff.; unedited portions and related fragments are published in the Appendix to my study, pp. 225–236.

tion, are contained all the Gregorian arguments for belittling kingship. After rehearsing the superior competence of the priest in that he can loose and bind in heaven,[77] that he can open the gates of paradise or close them,[78] that he can change the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ,[79] that he can through baptism change sons of perdition into sons of the adoption,[80] that he makes possible "perpetual resurrection" of the flesh, that he is an angel of the Lord,[81] and that he is a *christus*,[82] the compiler of these Gregorian arguments continues:

> The royal power, as it is terrestrial and corporeal, exercises dominion only over bodies and even then but imperfectly; it has no power at all in heaven, little enough even in the narrowest confines of the earth. *Thus if we should wish to compare this power to sacerdotal privilege, livid lead will be compared to effulgent gold.* But this also must be said that the king is son of the Church, not *presul*: pupil, not master; subject, not . . .

Here the fragment breaks off. The next word is doubtless *prelatus*.

The now familiar "Ambrosian" passage is here for the first time simply paraphrased; and then comes an uncompleted series of contrasting phrases. Among these the *discipulus-magister* contrast (an allusion to Luke 6:40) is found both in our opening quotation from "Ambrose" [83] and, probably independently of him, in Gregory's second letter to Hermann.[84] But all the phrases bear, curiously enough, very close resemblance to those in the passage from Pope John VIII quoted above [85] which in Gratian will immediately follow the excerpt from Gregory's second letter to Hermann as arranged in the Decretum.

Since all the other pieces in the codex of the Norman Anony-

[77] Cf. the second letter to Hermann, ed. by E. Caspar, p. 548, 14 f; 556, 20 f.
[78] Cf. ibid., 550, 4.
[79] Cf. ibid., 556, 20.
[80] Cf. ibid., 556, 18.
[81] Cf. ibid., 550, 7.
[82] The second letter to Hermann says that a *sacerdos* is a *deus*, 553, 12. It is in the letter to William that Gregory argues that a bishop is both a *deus* and a *christus*. See quotation above, p. 55.
[83] See above, opening Excerpt.
[84] Loc. cit., 553, 4.
[85] See above, at n. 60. There I have italicized the constrasting concepts which appear in our Norman fragment. The reconstruction *prelatus* is suggested by *praeferre* in the sentence from John.

mous belong roughly to the last quarter of the eleventh century, our stray Gregorian leaf, which summarizes rather than adduces sources, could not, of course, be a transcript of Gratian. But the writer must have had before him just such a composite of "places" as Gratian himself was later to employ at this point.[86]

The only important claim for the priesthood made by our Norman Gregorian fragment and not found in Gregory's second letter to Hermann is the asseveration that the *sacerdos* is a *christus*. It is, however, precisely this claim which intensifies Gregory's rebuke of William for imprisoning his bishop brother in Rouen in 1083.

It would have been quite natural for the Norman Anonymous, who composed, mostly in the cathedral of Rouen, thirty of the thirty-one tracts and fragments of MS C.C.C.C. 415, to have come as publicist to the defense of the Conqueror against the suffragan bishop of Bayeux and against the Pope; and all the more plausible if, as I have suggested, the Norman Anonymous was in fact the archbishop himself, William Bona Anima.

Archbishop William had his own grievances against Gregory, who had several times suspended him from his clerical office. Cleric and king were, moreover, very closely associated from the days when William Bona Anima had been abbot of St. Stephen's in Caen, which was consecrated with great splendor in the presence of the donor-king in 1077, former Abbot Lanfranc having become Archbishop of Canterbury. If we but recall that Archbishop Lanfranc, according to de Crozals, originally counseled the imprisonment of Odo, it will not seem surprising that the archbishop of the cathedral city where Odo was confined will also

[86] The same passage from Pope John, not, however, connected with Gregory's letter, is quoted by Anselm of Lucca, c. 1083; iv. 12; ed. F. Thaner, pp. 196 f. It is found linked with Gregory's letter in the as yet unedited Polycarpus, i, 19 (20), 3, composed between 1104 and 1106 by Gregory, cardinal of Saint Chrysogonus. Fournier and Le Bras, op. cit., II, 171; 277. The John passage is also found in the likewise unedited Collectio Caesaraugustana, vii, 18, which reproduces at this point Anselm of Lucca. Ibid., 275. Close connections exist between this Collectio, Ivo's Decretum, and the Polycarpus. Ibid., 274: 277.

It is in part the fact that Böhmer and his successors have convincingly connected most of the other thirty tractates of the unique codex to events or circumstances c. 1100 that constrains me from dating fragment J10 *after* Gratian.

The John passage is mentioned briefly by Piero Leicht, "Gregorio VII e il diritto romano," Studi Gregoriani, I (1947), 98, n. 7.

have found occasion to defend the act of the Duke against the Pope. That Archbishop William Bona Anima had later (November 10, 1095) to be firmly instructed by Pope Urban II to see to the restoration of lands to Odo's episcopal successor in Bayeux just as they had been at Odo's imprisonment would also point to Bona Anima's involvement on the side of William the Conqueror against Odo.[87]

As himself a *sacerdos*, the Norman Anonymous, presumably the archbishop, could best counter Gregory's letter of rebuke, not by denying the status of a bishop as a *deus* and a *christus*, but rather by showing that the king and duke is likewise a *deus* and, by virtue of his sacring, also a *christus*. And since, moreover, the monarch exercises authority over a larger area than any one diocese or province, he is superior to any one bishop or archbishop, even the apostolic bishop of Rome, although king and bishop are alike *christi* by the grace of that consecration whereby Christ, God by nature, makes his appearance in the guise of royal and sacerdotal rulers. The liturgically anointed king is set apart from other men and is hence by office as much a *sanctus* as is the Pope.[88] This is the argument of the famous "De consecratione pontificum et regum."

There are two versions of the tractate in the codex. One begins with an exordium which I have previously conjectured, on the basis of liturgical quotations in it, might have been composed separately either on the occasion of the dedication of St. Stephen's in 1077 [89] or the coronation of Henry I in 1100.[90] Now that I have traced the influence of the "Ambrosian" gold-lead passage and its combination with the Gelasian Duo sunt in Gregory's correspondence, I believe it is quite possible that the exordium and one or another of the two versions of "De consecratione" represent the

[87] Urban's letter is printed by V. Bourrienne, Antiquus cartularius ecclesiae Baiocensis (Rouen 1902), I, p. 213 f.; earlier in "Odon de Conteville," Revue catholique de Normandie, X (1900), pp. 270 f.; and reprinted by J. Ramackers, Papsturkunden in Frankreich II, Normandie, No. 3, pp. 55 f. Abhandlungen, Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, 3rd series, XXI, (1937).

[88] L. d. l., III, esp. 668, 32–669, 28 and the long development of *sanctus* left out by Böhmer and now printed in The Norman Anonymous, pp. 225–28. Note especially "Ex quibus occupare," which seems to be a response to the Gregorian assertion of exclusively worldly preoccupations in princes.

[89] The Norman Anonymous, 104.

[90] Ibid., 76.

response of the clergy or specifically Archbishop William of Rouen in defense of King William's continued imprisonment of his bishop brother Odo in Rouen despite Pope Gregory's rebuke.

It is true that "De consecratione" does not directly take up the gold-lead comparison of the three Gregorian letters we have been examining, but it does insist upon the golden character of the church. The exordium, for example, takes up directly the argument that the church (*mater, ecclesia*, the *sponsa Christi*), standing at the right hand of Christ, is called in Psalm 44:10 *regina*. Hence the church of the realm may be thought of as joined to the king at the time of his liturgical sacring in what the Norman Anonymous daringly calls "the sacrament of the royal nuptials." [91] The bishop, it is not denied, is likewise wedded to his diocesan church, but, since that which Christ proclaimed was a kingdom and not a priesthood, the Church is quite properly described in Scriptures as a *regina* rather than as a *sacerdotissa*. The liturgical anointment of the king is therefore primary and normative, while the consecration of the bishop in being joined to his diocesan church is secondary and analogous, that is, the bishop, as a kind of anointed *regulus*, does indeed *rule* in his own diocesan realm.

The Anonymous quotes the key verse of the epithalamian Psalm 44:10: "Astitit regina a dextris tuis, in vestitu *deaurato*, circundata varietate." [92] Thus already in the second sentence of "De consecratione" the Norman Anonymous is acknowledging that the *ecclesia* as the whole of the Christian people (rather than as the *sacerdotium* alone) is indeed golden, but as golden also royal. It will be recalled that Clement of Alexandria connected royal gold and the Holy Spirit [93] and Rabanus Maurus quoted the same "Astitit regina" at the opening of his disquisition on gold.[94] Moreover, the dedication sermon here cited by the Anonymous [95] mentions gold four times and, quoting I Kings 10:2, interprets the gold brought by the queen to the *rex pacificus* as the gold of faith brought by the Church to Christ her Lord.

[91] Gregory also uses the phrase *regales nuptias* in connection with lauding Henry IV before their relations had worsened. E. Caspar, Register, ii, 31; p. 166, 2.

[92] L. d. l., III, 662, 29 f.

[93] See above, at n. 35.

[94] See above, at n. 37.

[95] Ascribed to Augustine (loc. cit., 662, 30); cf. the Homiliarium of Paul the Deacon, PL, XCV, col. 1457; ed. F. Wiegand, p. 64. The Norman Anonymous, 75.

Again, over against the arguments of Gregory's second letter to Hermann and his epistolary rebuke of William, king and duke, the Norman Anonymous holds that far from the king being confined to bodies, he who would rule bodies *well* must take thought also of the souls, "ut in resurrectione simul utraque salventur." [96] In support of this claim, interestingly, the Anonymous adduces a passage ascribed to Ambrose on the royal-priestly character of all who are baptized, bodies and souls being together consecrated. [97] The Norman Anonymous very near the beginning cites the Gelasian Duo sunt [98] interpreting *mundus* as *ecclesia*, governed by the two powers which co-rule with Christ the "subditos; genus electum, gentem sanctam, populum adquisitionis, qui est ecclesia." [99]

We cannot here insist further on the connection between Gregory's three letters in which he uses the "Ambrosian" gold-lead passage and the tractates of the Norman Anonymous. Suffice it to observe that the clerical publicist of Rouen cathedral also envisaged a tripartite Christian society. First there is the *golden* realm (at once Spiritual, because of the unction of the Holy Spirit, and corporeal) co-ruled by anointed kings and bishops (*christi* and *dei*). Under them come secondly the monastic clergy. [100] Significantly, the Anonymous eloquently defends *episcopal* authority over against *abbatial* authority (with its recourse to the Pope) in a later tractate, "De Romano pontifice," by quoting extensively from his earlier defense of royal-ducal authority in "De consecratione." [101] And, thirdly, come the Christian laity, who, by reason of their royal-priestly baptism are themselves given a much higher status than in most medieval schemes, as the elect of God over against the reprobate. The latter, the members of Satan, were largely, it would appear, recruited in Rome.

The Norman Anonymous came very close to regarding royalist-episcopal Christianity as the golden polity, the highest of the three

[96] L. d. l., III, 663, 32 ff.
[97] Ibid., 663, 35 ff.
[98] Ibid., 663, 26 f.
[99] Ibid., 663, 16 f.
[100] Several of the Norman tractates defend episcopal authority over abbots, using the argument of the diocesan church as *mater ecclesia* over her monastic daughter churches and also the argument of "Quid vos tangit."
[101] L. d. l., III, 684, 43 ff. copies De consecratione 663, 25 ff.

suggested by Clement of Alexandria; for the royalist-episcopal Church-Kingdom was based upon the sacramental importance of the unction of the Holy Spirit in baptism, consecration, and sacring. Although the Norman Anonymous fought the Gregorian *use* of the "Ambrosian" gold-lead concept, he was no less one with the author of the Sermo in his high view of the episcopate as golden.

We may now conclude this Note. The Sermo de dignitate sacerdotali, because of the language and style, the history of its transmission, and the concept of the episcopate therein delineated, should be placed well before the tenth century, perhaps in the late fourth or fifth. Derived from or ascribed to Ambrose, its extreme episcopalianism, supposedly from the lips of the fourth-century bishop of Milan who had humbled Theodosius, tended to impair the value of the whole Sermo, alike for abbot and for Pope, until in the eleventh century a monkish Pope monopolized for the Bishop of Rome what the Sermo had asseverated of *all* bishops, and, by judicious selection from it and combination of this with a quotation from Gelasius, contrived to make plausible an interpretation of the "*Duo* quippe sunt" as the *golden* priesthood and the *leaden* state. The vivid "Ambrosian"-Gregorian phrase was widely copied by canonists; and at least once, so it appears, it was skilfully turned to royalist purposes by an anonymous cleric of Rouen (possibly Archbishop Will'am Bona Anima) who defended William the Conqueror against Gregory's charge of sacrilege in the incarceration of the bishop of Bayeux in the citadel of Rouen. Interest in the striking phrase passed away [102] in the Age of Innocent III, the immemorial metallic contrast between gold and lead

[102] Placidus, monk of Nonantula, later bishop of an unknown see, quoted the Sermo independently of Gregory in his Liber de honore ecclesiae, c. IIII. L. d. l., II, 606, 38–609, 30; PL, CLXIII, col. 654–7. Placidus, opposing the compromises of Pope Paschal, was interested especially in the anti-simoniacal passage exploited by Abbo of Fleury and by Cardinal Humbert, but he included also the gold-lead passage in its entirety, going beyond the selection of Gregory to reproduce the whole of Ambrose's tripartite social scheme with the *sacerdotium* supreme over the *regnum* and the *laici*. The otherwise unoriginal Placidus went so far as to maintain that bishops rule also over bodies (cap. 72).

In 1433, Giles Charlier (1472), professor of theology at Paris, arguing as emissary of the Council of Basel with the leader of the Taborites in defense of the supremacy of the *sacerdotium*, likewise adduced among other arguments, but apparently not independently of Gregory or Gratian, the gold-lead passage from the Sermo. E. Martène and U. Durand, Amplissima Collectio, VIII, 1733, col. 460.

having been eclipsed by the astral contrast, already suggested by Gregory,[103] between the splendor of the papal sun and the derivative pallor of the imperial moon set in the firmament which is the Church.

[103] Letter to William in 1080, viii, 25; ed. E. Caspar, 550; cf. his n. 3.

ROYAL MYSTERIES IN EGYPT

A small scrap of papyrus from Antinoopolis has been edited and commented on by C. H. Roberts [1] and treated in a very learned paper by A. Delatte.[2] I print the text with a few remarks due to these scholars.

1.]η λειμῶν
2. μ]υρρίνην εἴλετ[(Myrtle was used in the mysteries; cf. in the Eleusinian mysteries the bundles of twigs called βάκχοι.)
3.]ην ὦ Τριπτόλεμε σ[
4.]υ σοι νῦν μεμυηκ[
5.]την Κόρην εἶδον ἡ[ρπασ-
6. μ]ένην οὐδὲ τὴν Δη[μήτερα
7. λε]λυπημένην, ἀλ[λὰ (These supplements seem well founded.)
8. ν]εικηφόρους βα[σιλέας (These are certain. See Delatte, p. 203.)
9.]ν μυστικὸν τ[

Delatte calls attention (p. 204 et seq.) to the relation between the traditional mysteries and ruler worship, but finally he comes to the conclusion that a scene in the Underworld is described; he refers to the word λειμῶν in line 1, thinking that it is the asphodel meadow. This is not decisive and I cannot find this explanation satisfactory. I conjecture that the text refers to mysteries celebrated in honor of a Ptolemaic king. Of course, the script belongs to the second century A.D., but Roberts thinks that the writer followed a model from the Ptolemaic age.

The reason for this interpretation is the special connection of Triptolemos, the hero of agriculture, with Egypt and the equation with him of the Ptolemaic king. Delatte has set this forth well. I need only summarize the evidence and refer the reader for a fuller account to his paper. There was an affinity between Triptolemos and Egypt, the country producing the greatest wealth of corn. An Apulian vase, earlier than the establishment of the Ptolemaic kingdom, represents Triptolemos on the shore of the Nile (so named). On the Tazza Farnese a Ptolemaic king is represented in the guise of Triptolemos. After the Roman emperors became masters of Egypt this was transferred to them. On the silver patera from Aquileia an emperor of the Julio-Claudian house poses as Triptolemos sowing. On a cameo in the Bibliothèque nationale

[1] C. H. Roberts, The Antinoopolis Papyri I, 1950, No. 18, pp. 39 ff.

[2] A. Delatte, Le papyrus d'Antinoopolis relatif aux mystères. Bull. de la classe de lettres de l'Académie de Belgique, xxxvii, 1952, pp. 194 ff.

in Paris the emperor and the empress ride in a car drawn by serpents, driven by the empress, the emperor is sowing corn.[3] Alexandrian coins of the second century A.D. show the figure of Triptolemos.

The text speaks of mysteries. That an initiation has taken place is proved by the word *μεμυηκ.*, 1. 4; the last line adds *μυστικόν*. The Eleusinian mysteries were not transferred to Alexandria, but the cult of Demeter in this city was influenced by them.[4] Triptolemos was an Eleusinian hero, but here Demeter and Kore are expressly said to be absent. Triptolemos is the chief personage. He is invoked. This is the decisive point. If in Greek mythology a personage was sought for, symbolizing and insuring the principal wealth of Egypt, a rich yield of corn, none was more appropriate than Triptolemos. Moreover he was associated with the famous Eleusinian mysteries. Their old agrarian significance had faded in the late fifth and fourth century, the hopes of a better life in the Other World coming into the foreground in this age. Triptolemos appears in the vase paintings of this time only as a subordinate figure. But he was not forgotten as a ploughman and a sower. According to monarchical theory the king, who sometimes was identified with a god, was the source of all the boons of the country and so too of a plentiful yield of corn. From this point of view, he was identified with Triptolemos, as the monuments show. The late Hellenistic age was fond of mysteries, and in this case the association of Triptolemos with the time-honored and venerated Eleusinian mysteries gave a starting point and stimulus. As the king was identified with him, consequently his mysteries became part of the ruler cult.

It ought not to be surprising that the Ptolemaic kings were celebrated in a mystery cult. The mysteries devoted to the emperors are well known. The cult of the emperors is a continuation of Hellenistic ruler cult, and so too the ruler mysteries. In a time which was fond of mystery cults, as was the Hellenistic age, it was natural to enlarge the ruler cult with mysteries.

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[3] These monuments are discussed and their Alexandrian origin proved by Ch. Picard, L'éleusinisme à Rome au temps de la dynastie julio-claudienne. Rev. des études latines, xxviii, 1950, p. 77, and especially La patère d'Aquileia et l'éleusinisme à Rome aux debuts de l'époque impériale, L'Antiquité classiqûe, xx, 1951, pp. 351 ff., with figures of the monuments.

[4] See my Gesch. d. griech. Religion, II, p. 90. Cf. Athen., v, p.203 C: *μόνος γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ χρυσορόας καλούμενος Νεῖλος μετὰ τροφῶν αφθόνων καὶ χρυσὸν ἀκίβδηλον καταφέρει ἀκινδύνως γεωργούμενον, ὡς πᾶσιν ἐξαρκεῖν ἀνθρώποις δίκην Τριπτολέμου πεμπόμενον εἰς πᾶσαν γῆν.*

ON THE THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF PLATO'S ETHICS [1]

There are several well known commentators who hold that Plato "identifies" God with good, or goodness, or the good, or the Idea of the good. [2] And there are several others who come very close to saying this. [3] I should like to show not only that *this* interpretation is wrong, but also the weaker or perhaps more plausible one that Plato holds that the ground of value or obligation is what God approves or commands.

I shall start from the Euthyphro which is reminiscent of some renowned medieval debates and which contains the first statement of the independence of morality from theology (*pace* Prof. Jaeger: see his Aristotle, pp. 88, 242 f.). Socrates is made to say there that "the holy [or right] [4] is loved [by the gods] because it is holy not holy because it is loved [by the gods]"; [5] and he is made to contradict Euthyphro who maintains that "what is dear to the gods is holy and what is not is unholy." [6] In other words, Socrates says in effect that no divine will, desire, attitude, feeling or command, as such, confers bindingness on what (for Plato) is good or right. [7] Its bindingness is due rather to

[1] Part of my doctoral thesis, Widener Library, Harvard, 1952. I am indebted to Professors R. Demos, H. Bugbee, W. Jaeger and J. Wild for advice given in the course of writing the dissertation; also to Professors D. C. Williams, H. D. Aiken, P. Rhinelander, C. Cavarnos, A. Stampolis, T. C. Lockard, Mr. C. H. Donohoe and Miss J. L. Cook; and to Sir David Ross for some of my references to Plato's text.

[2] See e.g., J. Adam, The Religious Teachers of Greece (1908), pp. 442 ff. A. Diès, Autour de Platon (1927), II, esp. 555 ff., 575. W. Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development (tr. R. Robinson, 2nd ed., 1948), p. 88, cf. pp. 242 f. C. Ritter, The Essence of Plato's Philosophy (tr. A. Alles, 1933), esp. pp. 374, 387. L. Robin, Platon (1935), pp. 249 ff., 322. A. J. Festugière, Contemplation et Vie Contemplative Selon Platon (1936), pp. 204 f., 264 ff., 476 ff.

[3] E.g., R. C. Bury, The Philebus of Plato (1897), pp. 207, 213. F. Paulsen, A System of Ethics (tr. F. Thilly, 1900), p. 43. W. Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture (tr. G. Highet, 1944), II, 284–286; The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (1948), p. 251, n. 67. G. E. Mueller, "Plato and the Gods" (The Philosophical Review, XLV (1936), 457–472). Cf. R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Philosophical Method (1933), p. 127.

[4] In Euthyphro 11e4–12e8, Socrates discusses the (logical) relation between *hosion* and *dikaion*, and concludes that the former is "part" (*morion*, *meros*) of the latter (11e4, 12d3, 12d5–6). Cf. Gorgias 523a7–b1. (My references are to J. Burnet's Platonis Opera, 1901–1907.)

[5] Euthyphro 10d6–7. See also ibid., 10d12–b3.

[6] Ibid., 6e10–7a1, repeated in 9e1–3 and 15c, in somewhat modified forms.

[7] Cf. A. E. Taylor, Plato: the Man and His Work (6th ed., 1949), p. 151.

the fact that the object or action in question exemplifies a certain characteristic (proportion, say) [8] or is conducive to something which exemplifies that characteristic. [9]

One might retort that in the Laws, for example, Plato's position is such that it does not warrant my interpretation that he keeps God or God's attitudes distinct from what is good or right, on the ground that he says there (716c4) that "God is the measure of all things." But a careful reading of the context in which Plato says this reveals that his intention was rather to repudiate Protagoras' humanism or subjectivism than to state his opinion as to the relation between God and goodness. Professor Jaeger, for one, might be ready to accept this as a possibility; for he says in a note that Plato's intention was indeed to dismiss Protagoras' humanism (Paideia, II, 416, n.44). As a matter of fact, this intention is manifest in the text itself. Plato writes: "God is the measure of all things, not man as people usually say: the words are far *more* true of him" (716c4–6). Plato does not make a categorical statement — "God is the measure of all things" period; but rather a comparative one, as the word "more," which I italicized, indicates. Besides, we have Plato's cosmology according to which God is merely one among four "creative factors," to use Professor Demos' expression, and on the same cosmogonical footing with good or what ought to exist. [10] In the next place, we have witnessed Plato making some such distinction in the Euthyphro.

Further, in the Timaeus and while discussing the genesis of the cosmos, Plato repeatedly says that God introduced order, harmony and the like into the world "considering that this was in every way better" (30a5–6; Jowett tr.). He does not say that God did this because he felt like doing it. Yet if we are willing to ascribe a theological view of ethics to Plato we are bound to hold something like this. Again, Plato says that "God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad,

[8] Or moderation, etc., Philebus 20d1–4, 65a ff., and elsewhere; see my dissertation ch. viii.

[9] Cf. e.g. Timaeus 87c4–90d7. For a rough statement of Plato's standard of value and related matters, see my "Plato on Ethical Disagreement" (Phronesis, vol. I, no. 1).

[10] See R. Demos, The Philosophy of Plato (1939), pp. 6 ff., ch. iii; "The Fundamental Conceptions of Plato's Metaphysics" (The Journal of Philosophy, XXXII (1935), 564 ff.). Also: F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (1937), pp. 34 ff., 41; W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (1950), pp. 42 ff., 78 ff., 235 ff.; J. Wild, "Plato and Christianity: A Philosophical Comparison" (The Journal of Bible and Religion, XVII (1949), 9); J. Burnet, Greek Philosophy: Part I (1914), pp. 169n, 337 ff.; Taylor, op. cit., pp. 232, 288; however, in ibid., p. 289, Taylor asserts that "the Form of Good is what Christian philosophy has meant by God, and nothing else."

so far as this was attainable" (30a2–3). This passage clearly indicates that Plato does not construe God's action as the ground of, let alone identical with, goodness, and because of this he can imply that God first considered what is good and then acted. In other words, Plato says in effect that God was motivated by a consideration of what is good, and that His action was conditioned by His thinking that order and harmony are good, and that "seeing" that these are good He set Himself the task of introducing them into the world. He does not say that God merely acted, but that He acted in view of the good — with a view to what is best or better. Indeed the phrase "so far as this was attainable" makes it plain that Plato does not hold that God and goodness are identical. Otherwise there would be no point in his adding the phrase — which is added several times.[11] Indeed the phrase indicates that for Plato God's intervention is good, not *simpliciter* but because order and harmony are good. So the order is reversed and God's act is good but derivatively so, namely because it introduces harmony and order.[12]

Finally, Plato repeatedly *predicates* "good" of God or says that God does good, and not only in the Timaeus,[13] but in other dialogues too. For instance, in the Laws (967a4) he speaks of "God's accomplishing good." In the second book of the Republic (379b1) he says that "God is good," and recommends that the guardians should teach the members of the ideal community that "he is good." And in the Phaedo (97c4–6) Socrates' *nous* is not the creator of goodness but its onlooker, so to speak.

In conclusion let me remind one of, though this does not necessarily mean that I subscribe to, Burnet's argument that in Plato the Idea of good is not identical with God on the ground that the former is a "form" while the latter is a "soul" (loc. cit.). And let me suggest that it is probably because we conceive of God as being good that we think it natural to suppose that Plato made what is good depend upon God's approval of it;[14] and it is plain that if we did not predicate goodness of God we would not be so readily inclined to ascribe a theological view of ethics to Plato. This only shows, however, that we do, if only unwittingly, distinguish between God and goodness, and assume that our

[11] Timaeus 30a3, 32b5, passim. See on this Cornford, op. cit., p. 37.

[12] There is a similarity between my critique of the theological view of Plato's ethics and A. E. Taylor's critique of the view which makes Plato identify what is true with what God thinks (A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (1928), pp. 81–82). Nevertheless there are important dissimilarities between these two types of argument, which, however, cannot be discussed here. Also, I noticed Taylor's argument after I developed mine.

[13] See further Timaeus 29e1–3, 30a3–b6, 30c3–31a1, 41a7–b2.

[14] See e.g. Ritter's reasoning, op. cit., pp. 388–389.

and Plato's God is not *any* kind of God but a good One.[15] Logically speaking, in other words, the utterance "God is good" is not an identity one, so that those who think that it is are logically confused.[16] Now when I say that Plato's ethics is not theological I mean, among other things, that he does not make this logical error. I also mean that he does not identify *the* good with God.

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[15] Timaeus 29e1 ff.; "God being good. . .", etc. Cf. A. C. Ewing's discussion of the theological view of ethics (The Definition of Good, 1947).

[16] For my latest views on the relation between divinity and goodness see my "God = Worshiped" forthcoming in The Christian Scholar, but especially my "Deity-Value" forthcoming in The Hibbert Journal where I also bring in Plato and the soul.

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Ralph Marcus

University of Chicago.

All readers of the *Review* will share our sorrow over the untimely death of the author. He had accomplished much.

BOOKS RECEIVED

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